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Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax 
System† 
John T. Scholz 
I. INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY, COERCION, AND CONTRACTUAL 
COMPLIANCE IN THE AMERICAN TAX SYSTEM 
In order to enhance the general welfare, democratic governments 
facilitate broader exchanges among citizens by elaborating the rights 
and associated obligations of citizenship. To contain the threat of 
coercive government necessary to enforce these rights and 
obligations, democratic institutions must be capable of ensuring the 
credibility of the citizen’s implicit “tax contract” with the state. When 
democratic institutions can establish this credibility, citizens behave 
as adaptive contractarians, complying with state defined obligations 
to the extent that the state and other citizens reciprocate by respecting 
the citizen’s own rights.1 
The income tax system has become a critical foundation for 
modern democracies, providing the primary means of financing the 
expansion of rights and obligations. Thus, the tax system provides a 
critical research site for understanding not only compliance with tax 
obligations, but also for understanding the broader relationship 
between democratic citizens and their government. 
In this Article, I will elaborate on the adaptive contractarian 
perspective and apply it to the obligation to pay personal income 
taxes—the financial foundation of modern governance. The goal of 
 
 † This extract from the pre-publication manuscript of NEITHER FEAR NOR DUTY: 
CONTRACTUAL COMPLIANCE WITH TAX OBLIGATIONS IN DEMOCRACIES, copyrighted by John 
T. Scholz, is printed with permission of the author. For the full reference of this book, contact 
the author at john.scholz@fsu.edu. 
  Professor, Department of Political Science, Florida State University. 
 1. The adaptive contractarian perspective extends Levi’s concept of contingent 
compliance. See MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988). 
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the forthcoming book from which this Article is taken is to 
empirically test the relevance of this perspective for explaining both 
the main features of the tax system and citizens’ compliance with tax 
obligations. Additionally, we (the books authors) will consider the 
implications of this perspective for the design of tax enforcement 
systems and policies. We hypothesize that citizens obey tax laws to 
the extent that other citizens and governmental institutions meet their 
related obligations, and that the coercive institutions of governance, 
in turn, are compelled to respect citizens’ rights.  
In this section I discuss the basic dilemma of democratic 
governance—how to design and control coercive institutions capable 
of ensuring compliance with legal obligations without destroying 
citizens’ basic democratic rights. Section II extends the contractual 
perspective developed in political economy to the general problem of 
democratic governance, arguing that coercive powers provide 
efficient means of enforcing contracts, but, ironically, also threaten 
the very rights they are intended to protect. Section III applies the 
contractual model directly to taxes, analyzing the extent to which the 
American tax system’s institutional controls over the coercive powers 
in the tax system fit the contractual model. Section IV then describes 
the historical evolution of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 
emphasizing the tradeoffs between efficiency and control that have 
shaped the IRS. 
The rational choice model associated with the contractual 
perspective appears to be an implausible basis for a model of the 
American taxpayer, so Section V turns to political psychology to 
understand how ordinary citizens can behave as adaptive 
contractarians without paying much attention to the state’s affairs. By 
analyzing tax collection as a collective action problem requiring a 
contractual solution, we provide an integrated perspective on the role 
of deterrence, duty, and social controls that dominate current theories 
of tax compliance. Finally, Section VI discusses some policy 
implications of the adaptive contractarian perspective that contradict 
common beliefs based on the narrower deterrence perspective. 
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A. Income Tax, Democracy, and Contractual Compliance 
The income tax system is one of the most remarkable institutional 
innovations of twentieth century democracies. In less than a century, 
the U.S. federal income tax grew from nonexistence to being the 
dominant source of government revenue, providing a relatively 
efficient revenue foundation for the dramatic expansion of 
government services associated with the twentieth century welfare 
state. While the government has made available the benefits of 
government services to more citizens, the federal tax system has 
simultaneously expanded by requiring almost the entire population to 
report annual incomes and to pay taxes, thus becoming one of the 
most extensive and intrusive of revenue systems in history.2 
The historical roots of the income tax can be traced back to 
England, where it was imposed on a reluctant landed gentry to pay for 
the Napoleonic War after other forms of direct taxes had reached 
practical limits.3 The income tax first appeared in the U.S. to pay for 
Civil War debts, but was only used sporadically until a constitutional 
amendment clarified the legality of the tax system in 1913.4 Spurred 
particularly by the debts incurred during major wars, income tax 
became the primary source of government revenue.5 Individual 
income and related social security taxes accounted for over 78% of 
federal revenues by 1980 and continued to increase their share to 82% 
by 2001, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) collected 2.1 
trillion dollars.6 This long-term trend also exists in most Western 
European democracies.7  
As the federal government has become more dependent on the 
 
 2. For a comprehensive historical review of revenue systems, see CAROLYN WEBER & 
AARON B. WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN 
WORLD (1986).  
 3. See B.E.V. SABINE, A HISTORY OF INCOME TAX (1966) (describing the development 
of income tax in England). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 5. See JOHN WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
(1985) (providing a history of the income tax). 
 6. See Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Pub. No. 3385, Internal 
Revenue Service Accountability Report 20 (2001).  
 7. See B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23-
29 (1991). 
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income tax, the obligation to pay the tax has become more extensive 
and more "democratic.” The first major income tax legislation in the 
U.S. (after the Civil War tax), enacted in 1913, charged only 1% of 
taxable income, and only for the small number of families with 
income exceeding $4,000.8 By the 1970s, the expansion of income 
tax obligations exceeded for the first time the expansion of the 
franchise in terms of direct citizen involvement in government: in 
1975 the IRS reported that 84 million taxpayers filed individual 
returns,9 while 1975 election records show that 82 million citizens 
(53.6% of eligible voters) voted in the presidential elections.10 Since 
that time, the number of individual returns being filed has continued 
to increase more rapidly than the number of votes being cast in 
presidential elections, with almost 130 million individual returns filed 
in 2002.11  
The simultaneous expansion of democratic rights and income tax 
obligations across the spectrum of democracies in the twenty-first 
century raises the possibility that these rights and obligations are an 
inherent structural feature of democratic government. In particular, 
the dependence of national government on small payments by a large 
number of citizens provides a little understood instrument for 
democratic control that is unrelated to the electoral system. The 
primary hypothesis we explore in this book is that democratic citizens 
behave as adaptive contractarians who fulfill their tax and other 
obligations as long as the government, and other taxpayers, fulfill 
their obligations.  
By complying with these legitimate obligations, adaptive 
contractarians can provide the basis for the efficient provision of 
public goods and services. Additionally, by insisting that compliance 
with tax laws is contingent upon the government’s behavior, adaptive 
 
 8. A progressive surcharge was included in the 1913 Tax Act on incomes over $20,000, 
with rates increasing from 1% to 6% for incomes over $500,000. WITTE, supra note 5. The 
social security tax on payrolls was introduced in 1935, but individual income tax was limited to 
the wealthy until 1943, when the government extended withholding from payroll to middle and 
lower income groups, to pay the mounting expenses of World War II. Id. 
 9. See Selected Returns and Forms Filed During Specified Calendar Years, 1975-2003, 
at https://www.irs.gov/pubs-soi/03al22sr.xls (last visited May 12, 2003).  
 10. See National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-1996, at http://www.fec.gov/ 
pages/htmlto5.htm (last visited May 12, 2003). 
 11. See supra notes 9 & 10.  
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contractarians can impose democratic controls on government when 
they become frustrated with the lack of meaningful choice between 
candidates running for public office.12 Thus, compliance with 
government imposed tax, and other obligations potentially provides 
citizens with an alternative collective action mechanism to restrain 
the government’s coercive powers. 
This contractual compliance perspective is relatively unfamiliar to 
tax studies and generally strikes people as an implausible way of 
analyzing tax compliance. Thus, it is necessary to develop this broad 
argument in stages. Section II will develop the general contractual 
approach to democratic governance and the following sections will 
apply this approach to the structure of the tax system and the 
organization of the IRS. The basic argument is that the rights and 
obligations associated with the implicit tax contract are best 
understood in the broader context of the contractual rights and 
obligations that democratic governments developed to enhance 
citizen welfare. As with other contracts, state enforcement of tax 
obligations provides clear benefits only available if there are credible 
institutional assurances that the coercive powers necessary for 
efficient tax collection will not be used to exploit taxpayers. My 
primary task in the following section is to clarify the institutional 
requirements for a contractual compliance system, and to consider the 
compatibility of these requirements with the American tax system.  
II. EXCHANGE AND STATE ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS 
A. Exchange and Welfare  
Our approach to democracy reflects recent attempts in the political 
economy to analyze governance from the perspective of a welfare-
enhancing exchange.13 The conceptual framework builds on the 
assumption that mutually beneficial exchange drives enhanced 
 
 12. Consider, for example, the relative impact on the government if 10% of the voting 
population abstained from voting in an election compared to the impact if the same 10% 
abstained from paying their taxes. 
 13. See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL 
RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE (2002); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 
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welfare. Exchange encourages production specialization along the 
lines of natural comparative advantage, which in turn encourages the 
development of specialized skills and enhanced productivity, driving 
the growth of modern economies.14 However, specialization also 
introduces the problems of asymmetric information and opportunities 
for exploitation, which can inhibit exchange or impose considerable 
expenses, or “transaction costs,” that reduce the value of potential 
exchanges.15  
Direct exchange, like the textbook case of trading apples for 
oranges, appears to pose little problem. However, most exchanges 
require more complex contractual agreements involving, for both 
parties, various rights and obligations. Consider a buyer who would 
gladly pay $5,000 for a reliable car and a seller who would gladly sell 
her reliable car for $3,000. An exchange would enhance their 
combined welfare by $2,000, the difference in valuation between 
seller and buyer.  
Akerlof’s analysis of the “market for lemons” among used cars 
illustrates the information asymmetry and opportunism that hinders 
this beneficial exchange.16 The seller presumably knows whether or 
not the car is reliable, but the buyer does not.17 In fact, the buyer 
knows that lemons—unreliable cars—may be more likely to be for 
sale than reliable cars, because current owners would like to get rid of 
lemons.18 If buyers have no way of distinguishing between reliable 
cars and lemons, they will only be willing to pay the value of a 
lemon, for example, $2,500.19 If all sellers with reliable cars will not 
sell their cars for less than $3,000, only owners of lemons would be 
willing to sell, thus producing Akerlof’s market for lemons.20 The 
opportunism of sellers and the information asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers can create formidable barriers to exchange. 
 
 14. See, e.g., BARZEL, supra note 13; NORTH, supra note 13. 
 15. See NORTH, supra note 13; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: 
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). 
 16. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. OF ECON. 488 (1970). 
  17.  Id.  
 18. Id. at 490. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 489-90. 
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Without some credible way of assuring potential buyers that the car is 
not a lemon, the owners and seekers of reliable cars are likely to 
forego the exchange and hence the $2,000 in enhanced welfare.21  
The classical prisoner’s dilemma can help understand the 
consequences of asymmetric information and opportunism: both 
buyer and seller would be better off if they cooperate, but both face a 
dominant strategy to defect—the buyer by passing off a lemon as a 
good car, the seller by failing to make full payment.22 Although 
autonomous individuals contemplating a single transaction are 
unlikely to resolve this dilemma without a third party enforcer, 
members of a family or of a cohesive small group can readily 
overcome the problem by making the single exchange part of a larger 
series of exchanges.23 As long as future rewards contingent on 
continued cooperation within the group outweigh the short-term 
advantages of defection, transactors have no incentive to defect and 
the dilemma no longer acts as a barrier to trade.24 In other words, the 
agreement to buy a used car under these circumstances would be self-
enforcing, and would need no outside authority to enforce the 
contract. 
B. Exchange and Collective Action  
A similar exchange problem exists in the tax context in which 
citizens exchange tax dollars for the provision of public goods and 
services. Consider, for example, a small homogeneous village in 
which all residents would be better off if the village had a way to 
defend itself against marauding bands of thieves. If everyone 
cooperates to protect the village, everyone gains security without 
diminishing anyone else’s security. However, the problem emerges 
because each individual would also benefit if he or she could enjoy 
the benefits of protection without contributing to the village’s 
defense. Thus, the successful provision of public goods and services 
requires a mechanism to overcome the temptation to be a free rider, 
 
 21. Id. at 499-500. 
 22. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984). 
 23. Id. See also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION 
OF PROSPERITY (1995). 
 24. See AXELROD, supra note 22. 
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just as a successful exchange among individuals requires a 
mechanism to overcome the temptation to cheat on the contractual 
agreement. 
Again, cohesive small groups can, in theory, develop collective 
action mechanisms capable of supporting agreements to supply public 
goods. An agreement to defend the village would be self-enforcing if 
potential free riders would lose more by defecting than by 
cooperating with the agreement. For example, free riders could be 
ostracized or excluded from exchanging with other villagers. Of 
course, imposing these punishments also requires potentially costly 
actions from other villagers. Thus, any successful collective action 
mechanism would have to be incentive compatible—that is, villagers 
in a position to punish a free rider would have to benefit from 
inflicting rather than shirking the punishment.25 The cost of 
establishing and maintaining this full enforcement mechanism is a 
part of the transaction cost of producing the public good.  
“Club theory” demonstrates that incentive-compatible solutions 
are possible as long as the gains from the public good exceed the full 
costs of providing the good, including the cost of enforcing the 
contractual agreement.26 As actors and benefits become more 
heterogeneous, the observability of contributions becomes more 
difficult and the ability to single out individuals for exclusion or 
punishment becomes more limited, so the costs of creating fully self-
enforcing, incentive-compatible contracts increase.27 Given the 
prevalence of these real-life conditions, public goods can only be 
produced by self-enforcing contracts in limited “club” circumstances 
that can minimize enforcement costs.28 In practice, successful 
independent collective action mechanisms appear to be difficult to 
establish and to maintain, even in homogeneous village settings.29  
 
 25. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
1095 (1986). 
 26. See, e.g., Todd Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An 
Evaluative Survey, 18 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1481 (1980). 
 27. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990) 
(providing a general summary of trigger strategies and alternative solutions to maintain 
cooperative solutions). 
 28. See Sandler & Tschirhart, supra note 26. 
 29. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
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Exchange agreements for both private (e.g., used cars) and public 
(e.g., national defense) goods can enhance welfare, and self-enforcing 
agreements that make exchange possible are plausible in at least some 
small group settings. However, the greatest gains from exchange in 
modern economies are generally attributed to the expanded scope of 
anonymous exchanges in the marketplace, which allows various 
groups and individuals to exploit their comparative advantage and, 
more importantly, encourages enhanced productivity through 
specialization. However, this expanded exchange involves greater 
transaction costs in establishing credible commitments, particularly 
because greater specialization also leads to greater potential for 
exploitation. Thus, specialized third party services that reduce 
transaction costs play an increasingly important role in the global 
expansion of the marketplace, accounting for a large and increasing 
proportion of the total productivity in most modern economies.30  
C. The Advantages of State Contract Enforcement  
The state, among specialized contract enforcers, plays a critical 
role in expanding the ability of citizens to benefit from exchange, 
particularly because it alone monopolizes the legitimate use of 
violence and physical coercion.31 According to Barzel’s theory, once 
the state is powerful enough to effectively enforce property rights and 
contracts, individuals can minimize private investments in self-
defense.32 The state’s monopoly of legitimate coercion is particularly 
well suited to enforce contracts for autonomous market exchanges 
among strangers because this is where private enforcement is most 
difficult.33 Specialized state enforcers are motivated to expand and 
refine citizens’ property rights and duties in order to enhance the 
value of state-guaranteed contract exchange. Furthermore, citizens as 
“transactors” are motivated to switch to standardized state-guaranteed 
contracts whenever feasible because these contracts avoid the 
incentive compatibility costs involved in more customized third party 
 
 30. See NORTH, supra note 13. 
 31. See BARZEL, supra note 13. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 80. 
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or self-enforced exchange agreements.34  
In Barzel’s evolutionary scenario, legal delineation of property 
rights, court authority, specialized enforcement authorities of the 
state, and all other developments associated with the “rule of law” 
pave the way for the expansion of market transactions and the 
enhancement of wealth.35 Libecap provides a vivid example of the 
transition from inefficient self-enforced exchanges to a state-enforced 
market economy that occurred when silver was discovered in 
Nevada.36 The initial violence among claimholders enforcing their 
ownership rights was gradually replaced by the development of state 
institutions capable of delineating and enforcing property rights 
involving claims.37 This, in turn, created the conditions for the rapid 
development of the market.38 State-enforced property rights 
developed only after the value of the property made this delineation 
of rights worthwhile, but once they developed, state-enforced 
contracts dramatically increased the level of specialization and 
economic exchange.39  
By mediating contracts for private as well as public goods, 
specialized state mechanisms can craft refined property rights to 
improve the efficient resolution of collective problems resulting from 
the positive and negative externalities of existing exchanges. For 
private goods, the Coase Theorem on property rights demonstrates 
that the market inefficiencies associated with externalities would be 
resolved efficiently if one assigned property rights to minimize the 
transaction costs that would otherwise prevent the parties from 
negotiating an efficient contract.40 For public goods, the state could 
collect an efficient single tax to pay for an array of public goods, 
thereby minimizing the need for separate contracts and separate 
enforcing authorities for each public good. The income tax system 
provides an important example of this type of development. To the 
 
 34. Id. at 147-50. 
 35. Id. at 79. 
 36. Gary D. Libecap, Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of 
Western Mineral Rights, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 338 (1978). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 343-47. 
 39. Id. at 348-58. 
 40. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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extent that the state can successfully create and enforce standardized 
contracts for private and public goods, the resulting expansion of 
exchange and the increase in welfare would be accompanied by the 
expansion of state-enforced citizen rights and the related obligations 
necessary to gain these benefits. 
D. The Democratic Dilemma of Coercive State Enforcement 
Barzel’s theory of the state emphasizes that state monopolization 
of legitimate coercion brings not only potential gains in efficiency 
and wealth, but unfortunately also imposes a greater risk that the state 
will exploit citizens and threaten the very rights and enhanced welfare 
that the state was intended to ensure.41 An enforcement authority 
powerful enough to guarantee compliance of all contracting parties is 
also powerful enough to seize the property of any individual party. 
The problem of controlling coercive state powers is perhaps the major 
reason that private third party enforcers continue to play the dominant 
role in developing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts in modern 
economies, although their ability to function is predicated on the 
existence of a state-enforced system of property rights.42 
For Barzel’s citizens, the willingness to allow this dangerous 
concentration of coercive powers in the hands of specialized 
enforcers comes only because of the threat from other societies that 
have their own specialized enforcers. In small-scale societies,  
joint wealth is maximized when all abstain from specialized 
protection. But when all so abstain, it pays for some to revert to 
specialization in violence. Each predatory group benefits from 
the existence of peaceful ones . . . [Peaceful groups] can do 
better by having some of their members specialize in 
protection and then face their adversaries on nearly equal 
terms. Groups without specialized protectors are not viable in 
the long run when not isolated from other groups.43  
 
 41. BARZEL, supra note 13. 
 42. See NORTH, supra note 13. 
 43. BARZEL, supra note 13, at 201-02. 
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Of course, even dictators have a strong incentive to develop and 
enforce efficient property rights.44 Roving bandits that simply plunder 
the wealth of stable populations would discourage specialization and 
require all communities to invest heavily in self-defense.45 As a 
stationary bandit, however, a dictator has an incentive to encourage 
some level of economic development in order to extract the greater 
wealth that specialization in production provides.46 Bandits capable of 
extracting greater wealth to support a stronger coercive force replace 
those less competent in creating efficient property rights.47 It is the 
dictator, rather than the citizens, who captures the greatest gains from 
exchange and development.48  
Citizens would be best off in a state in which they could 
effectively defend themselves from roving and stationary bandits. 
Barzel argues that citizens support the development of state power 
out of necessity, only doing so after they develop some “collective 
action mechanism” sufficiently powerful to prevent the specialized 
protector from exploiting them.49 Without doing so, citizens would 
gain no advantage from the specialized protector, because a protector 
powerful enough to force all parties to abide by a contract would also 
have sufficient power to not only seize the gain from the protected 
exchange, but also to seize dictatorial power over all property.50 
Barzel emphasizes that citizens will rationally support the expansion 
of state enforcement powers only to the extent that they have some 
credible collective action mechanism that is capable of defending 
them against the enforcement authority.51 
Thus, the evolution of the specialized state enforcement 
authorities noted above links directly with the coevolution of 
collective institutions capable of controlling the coercive powers of 
these authorities. At every stage of the expansion of obligations and 
 
 44. See Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 567 (1993). 
 45. Id. at 568. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 568-69. 
 48. Id. 
 49. BARZEL, supra note 13, at 113-37. 
 50. Id. at 238. 
 51. Id. at 113-24. 
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enforcement institutions, powerful groups willingly support the 
expansion of state powers that enhance their benefits from exchange. 
However, these groups only support state power expansion to the 
extent that they remain capable of preventing state powers from being 
used against them. The development of state authority in Libecap’s 
Nevada example clearly benefited corporate mining interests, but did 
little to define and enforce property rights protecting the interests of 
those with little political influence.52 In short, the evolution of 
democratic institutions both limits and shapes the development of 
property rights and related specialized enforcement authorities.  
E. The Coevolution of Democracy, State Enforcement, and Exchange 
Theorists note that democracies, compared to dictatorships, have 
several potential advantages that tend to accelerate the wealth 
enhancing aspects of specialized enforcement. First, Olson argues 
that the most efficient system of property rights inevitably requires 
rights that defend individual wealth from the greatest predatory 
threat—the state.53 Thus, democratic rights defending the citizen 
against state coercion closely relate to economic rights protecting 
against confiscation, which provide the greatest security and hence 
the greatest incentive for specialization, exchange, and creation of 
wealth. It is tempting to explain the current dominant role of western 
democracies in general, and the U.S. in particular, in terms of the 
compatibility of democratic rights and property rights in the market 
economy.54 
Second, electoral competition within democracies may also drive 
policies toward efficient outcomes to the extent that electoral systems 
translate the increased wealth from efficiency gains into political 
influence.55 In Becker’s model, dominant political groups attempt to 
define rights and utilize state enforcement in order to favor their own 
 
 52. See Libecap, supra note 36. 
 53. Olson, supra note 44. 
 54. However, Olson also emphasizes the offsetting adverse consequences of 
institutionalized interest groups that constrain growth. Id. at 571. 
 55. Gary Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, 28 J. PUB. 
ECON. 329 (1985). 
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interests.56 Electoral competition, however, drives these political 
groups to utilize more efficient means of transferring and increasing 
wealth.57 The controversy surrounds whether the resulting policies do 
more to increase wealth or simply to transfer wealth. The argument in 
favor of government wealth enhancement parallels the market wealth 
enhancement argument. Political entrepreneurs or parties can 
potentially gain the support of those who are better off due to policies 
that increase the net surplus of consumers, producers, and all third 
parties affected by the exchange.58  
Politicians have a special motive to create property rights. 
Unlike money transfers (subsidies, entitlements) and the 
deadweight losses of pork barrel and regulatory cartels, 
property rights increase efficiency by encouraging owners to 
use assets most productively. Efficiency makes for prosperity, 
which rebounds to politicians’ credit.59  
Thus, political actors gain competitive advantages over others by 
resolving the problems of externalities, public goods, and other 
collective problems that inhibit the expansion of specialization and 
exchange. This evolutionary process might explain the historical 
expansion of the democratic franchise; as the state resolves the most 
pressing barriers to wealth expansion for mobilized sectors of the 
population, it can also make greater gains in economic efficiency by 
tackling the problems of previously unmobilized groups whose 
interests it has not previously addressed. Of course, the expansion of 
rights would be difficult without a coevolution of expanding 
obligations to comply with the rights of others and to pay for the 
enforcement of new rights. The income tax system and its obligations 
play a critical role in providing a means to support the expansion of 
rights. The income tax system also provides a critical arena for 
understanding the relationship between citizens and modern 
 
 56. Id. at 331-33. 
 57. Id. at 335. 
 58. See JAMES Q.WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980). 
 59. William H. Riker & Itai Sened, A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: 
Airport Slots, 35 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 951, 966 (1991). 
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democratic governments’ dramatically expanded enforcement 
powers.  
F. Summary: The Contract Perspective and Income Tax  
Thus far, the theoretical arguments emphasize the role that 
government plays in expanding welfare by broadening the scope of 
contracts. State enforced rights and obligations directly expand the 
basis for wealth enhancing contractual exchange of public and private 
goods. These rights and obligations provide the necessary foundation 
for the development of other specialized third party enforcers and 
services that further reduce transaction costs and increase exchange. 
Ironically, the very concentration of coercive powers that makes 
state enforcement so efficient also poses the greatest potential threat 
to the welfare of the citizens seeking the advantages from state 
enforcement of rights and duties. As exchange flourishes under the 
expanded state enforcement of rights and obligations, enforcement 
power becomes increasingly concentrated in state, rather than 
communal or private, institutions. This concentration of power 
increases the threat that specialized state enforcement agencies will 
exploit the contractarians who sought the enforcement of expanded 
rights and obligations. Consequently, the contract perspective implies 
that the structure of enforcement institutions will reflect not only 
citizens’ quest for efficiency gains through minimized enforcement 
costs, but also their often contradictory quest for controls and 
guarantees against the specialized state enforcer.  
The federal income tax system provides perhaps the most 
interesting laboratory for investigating how these contradictory quests 
influence the evolution of governance in general, and of specialized 
enforcement agencies in particular. As noted earlier, the tax system 
has rapidly expanded as an efficient means of financing public goods, 
including the creation and enforcement of rights and obligations that 
allow politically influential groups to benefit from expanded markets. 
The implicit tax contract allows the citizen to exchange taxes in 
return for public goods. Given the problem of free riding in modern 
democracies, however, a credible contract requires a powerful tax 
collector to assure each citizen that others will fulfill their obligations. 
Despite this requirement, tax obligations have become the most 
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widespread and onerous of all state imposed obligations, prompting 
citizens’ concerns that the powerful tax collector will exploit them.  
The contract perspective’s elaboration of control problems may be 
self-evident in the United States, where citizens have always been 
wary of government power. However, the contract perspective is 
useful to emphasize that the forces shaping the state’s enforcement 
institutions are part of a broader problem of governance extending 
beyond the specific evolution of constitutional rights in the United 
States. This contract perspective also emphasizes that our analysis of 
income tax compliance focuses on a small, but critical, component of 
the overall citizen response to the full array of state imposed rights 
and obligations. Most importantly, the contract perspective provides a 
framework for analyzing the institutional structure of the tax system 
from the perspective of the taxpayer as the critical contracting party. 
Given the trade-off between efficiency and control that lies at the 
heart of the democratic dilemma, one must ask what kind of 
institutional framework a rational contractarian would require to 
ensure the credibility of the tax contract. The next section considers 
this question in the broadest context of democratic institutions, and 
the ensuing section will focus more specifically on the IRS. 
III. DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS OVER THE TAX COLLECTOR 
Barzel describes three primary mechanisms that contractarians in 
“rule of law” societies use to protect themselves from potential 
exploitation: separation of powers,60 transparency of enforcement and 
adjudication,61 and political controls over enforcement authority.62  
A. Separation of Powers 
Barzel argues that the well-established separation of powers 
principle provides the most critical aspect of control.63 This principle 
disperses coercive power among multiple institutions in order to 
 
 60. BARZEL, supra note 13, at 131. 
 61. Id. at 45. 
 62. Id. at 130. 
 63. Id. at 131. 
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minimize the threat of concentrated power under a single authority.64 
For example, the separation of powers principle functions by dividing 
military powers between the army, navy, and air force, decentralizing 
control over localized police forces, developing independent 
bureaucracies to regulate and enforce different aspects of the 
economy, and fragmenting the power of functionally specialized 
bureaucracies by creating separate, and often competing, jurisdictions 
at the federal, state, and local level.65 The general structure of 
government in the United States, as well as the specific structure of 
federal tax enforcement, appears to follow Barzel’s design principle, 
reflecting the common observation that U.S. citizens are more 
concerned with controlling government authority than with making it 
efficient.  
Given the general concern with separation of powers, it is 
surprising that federal tax enforcement authority is concentrated 
exclusively in a single agency. Of course, IRS authority is limited to 
tax matters, with very limited involvement in other forms of police 
functions. Nontheless, efficiency concerns at least partially trump 
control concerns in the design of the federal tax system, suggesting 
the central importance of tax revenues for the federal government. 
B. Judicial and Procedural Safeguards  
In addition to dividing coercive powers, Barzel suggests that “rule 
of law” societies impose incentive compatibility constraints on 
specialized state enforcement institutions.66 In particular, Barzel notes 
the need to ensure that the enforcer’s adjudication procedures are 
transparent and that adjudication principles are clear.67 Without clear 
and open adjudication procedures for when citizens disagree with the 
actions of the enforcer, the enforcer could expropriate one citizen at a 
time in the name of enforcing obligations. Thus, the collective action 
mechanism would have no clear grounds upon which to constrain the 
enforcer until after the enforcer had already gained considerable 
 
 64. Id. at 131-33. 
 65. Id. at 133. 
 66. Id. at 168. 
 67. Id. at 45. 
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resources. Incentive compatibility constraints ensure that the enforcer 
knows that stealthy expropriation will be detected and punished well 
before the enforcer can gain sufficient power to dominate the 
collective action mechanism.  
Given the concentration of extensive enforcement authority in the 
IRS, procedural constraints are of even greater significance than in 
most other enforcement authorities. 
The basis of IRS constraints, as for all federal enforcement 
agencies, begins with the basic guarantees of individual rights, equal 
treatment, and due process set forth in the Bill of Rights. The 
independent judicial system clarifies and enforces these guarantees 
when it renders judgment for cases in which taxpayers accuse the IRS 
of arbitrary or capricious actions that infringe on taxpayer rights. 
Given the large number of taxpayers and the complexity of tax laws, 
Congress developed a specialized tax court to supplement the federal 
district, appellate, and Supreme courts.  
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA), which clarifies the due 
process standards that all federal agencies must meet, supplements 
the Bill of Rights’ basic constitutional guarantees.68 The APA 
requires agencies to promulgate formal rules to govern their decision-
making processes and to provide internal review procedures allowing 
taxpayer appeals.69 Essentially, the APA requires agencies to 
establish procedures ensuring that the principles of legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions also govern the authority delegated 
to agencies. The IRS, for example, has developed numerous 
enforcement and collections manuals formalizing the tax code and the 
specialized guidelines for different categories of taxpayers. The IRS 
publishes letter rulings in response to taxpayers’ law interpretation 
questions.70  
 
 68. Administrative Procedures Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701, 1305, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5870, 7521). 
 69. Id.  
 70. These rulings do not establish binding precedents like federal court rulings do. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/5
p139 Scholz.doc  9/23/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]   Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax 157 
 
C. Political Controls over Enforcement Authority 
Barzel emphasizes two important mechanisms that are necessary 
to control the coercive powers of state enforcement agencies, but 
unfortunately create less efficient state institutional structures 
compared to private third party enforcers.71 First, third party enforcers 
in the private sector are generally “residual claimants” who can claim 
their gains from enforcement as profit, while coercive state enforcers 
are generally salaried employees restricted by limited budgets.72 
Although the resulting bureaucratic incentives are inevitably less 
efficient than entrepreneurial incentives, budgetary control over state 
enforcers reduces the temptation for the agency to exploit taxpayers 
because the fruits of exploitation would not remain with the agency.73 
Both the President and Congress scrutinize the IRS budget and 
specify not only the amount of money devoted to enforcement 
activities, but also the number of personnel positions necessary to 
carry out enforcement. 
Second, third party enforcers are generally free to develop their 
own contractual rules. Because they are residual claimants, the 
system motivates private enforcers to develop contractual rules that 
provide the greatest gains for contracting parties and, hence, the 
greatest potential profit for the enforcer. To control the coercive 
powers of the state, on the other hand, elected officials develop the 
rules and the acceptable means of enforcing those rules. Although 
elected officials have some incentive to create efficient rules to 
benefit their electoral constituency, as noted earlier, this incentive is 
considerably weaker than would be the case for private enforcers. 
Given the extensive coercive potential in the power to tax, tax 
legislation is considerably more detailed than most other 
congressional legislation, leaving the IRS with less rulemaking 
discretion than that granted to most other federal agencies.74 The IRS 
 
 71. BARZEL, supra note 13, at 69. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See JOHN F. MANLEY, THE POLITICS OF FINANCE: THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS 
AND MEANS (1970). The complete Internal Revenue Code contained in Title 26 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations has more than 2.8 million words; printed 60 lines to a page. It would fill 
more than 6,000 letter size pages. See U.S. Tax Code, at http://www.fourmilab.ch/ 
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plays a surprisingly minor role in developing the tax code. The 
Department of Treasury and the Joint Congressional Committee on 
Taxation provide the primary sources of legislative proposals and 
official analyses, while the IRS’s role is generally limited to 
producing requested data files from its immense information 
archives.75 As a consequence, tax legislation rarely considers 
administrative and enforcement efficiency.  
To ensure effective budgetary and statutory controls over the IRS, 
the Department of Treasury, acting on behalf of the President, 
oversees the IRS. Both houses of Congress also actively oversee the 
IRS via the Joint Committee on Taxation. Complaints from 
constituents and the annual 20-40 IRS evaluation studies performed 
by the Congressional General Accounting Office also trigger 
congressional oversight. 
The next section considers in greater detail the coevolution of the 
IRS and the institutions that oversee and control its coercive powers, 
focusing specifically on the continuing tensions between control and 
efficiency that have affected the structure of the tax system.  
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
Of all of the specialized enforcement agencies, the IRS is arguably 
the most sheltered from direct political influence at all levels. 
Burnham, for example, argues that the IRS, “[t]he single most 
powerful agency in the federal government[,] has been mostly free of 
tough, informed congressional oversight” due to the congressional 
“fear of retaliation, the concern about upsetting the money machine, 
and the demands for special services by the well-financed PACs.”76 
Long contends that IRS enforcement procedures primarily reflect the 
idiosyncratic internal concerns of the agency, tax practitioners, and 
 
ustax/ustax.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2003). The on-line version of the tax code measures more 
than 21 megabytes in length and the table of contents alone contains more than 108 pages with 
2,467 sections, each pertaining to a different tax subject. Id. The CCH Standard Federal Tax 
Reporter, which contains a compilation of the Internal Revenue Code with case annotations, 
fills 25 volumes. 
 75. See John T. Scholz, The Compliance Research and the Political Context of Tax 
Administration, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES (Jeffrey A. Roth 
& John T. Scholz eds., 1989); see also THOMAS J. REES, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION (1980). 
 76. DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF. POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 305 (1989). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/5
p139 Scholz.doc  9/23/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]   Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax 159 
 
former IRS employees.77 Long claims that the IRS has little 
motivation from political oversight or elsewhere to correct abusive, 
unjust, or erroneous procedures. Scholz and Wood provide empirical 
evidence that IRS enforcement is less subject in particular to local 
political influence than other federal agency enforcement.78  
The tax collection system was not always sheltered from political 
pressures. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, one of the oldest federal 
agencies, handled tax collection prior to the reforms in the 1950s. 
Under the Bureau of Internal Revenue, state district directors had 
considerable enforcement discretion. Centralized systems to control 
local discretion, like those described by Kaufman regarding the 
forestry service,79 were not as developed in the IRS. This local 
autonomy enabled each office to develop procedures and 
interpretations of the federal statutes specifically tailored to the local 
economy and political interests. This decentralization also reduced 
the concentration of national power. As local economies became 
integrated into a national economy during and after World War II, 
however, the local variability in national standards became 
increasingly problematic. The political influence and corruption that 
accompanied local idiosyncrasies led to extensive national scandals in 
the early 1950s, the King Commission’s highly-publicized 
investigations, and the complete reorganization of the tax code and 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The tax collection agency was 
renamed the “Internal Revenue Service,” emphasizing the 
responsibility of the agency to provide a politically neutral, 
competent, and standardized national tax collection service.  
These reforms, combined with an extensive revision of the tax 
code in 1954, set the stage for four decades of IRS development. The 
IRS became an autonomous, functionally specialized, and centralized 
organization controlled primarily by career civil servants within the 
agency. Over time, Congress has increasingly codified enforcement 
 
 77. SUSAN LONG, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: MEASURING TAX OFFENSES AND 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE (1980). See also DIOGENES, THE APRIL GAME: SECRETS OF AN 
INTERNAL REVENUE AGENT (1973); PAUL N. STRASSELS, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
THE IRS: A TAXPAYER’S GUIDE (1979). 
 78. John T. Scholz & B. Dan Wood, Controlling the IRS: Principals, Principles, and 
Public Administration, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 141 (1998). 
 79. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER (1960).  
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procedures in statutes. Official IRS guidelines have further codified 
standard procedures and review processes that reduce individual 
auditors’ discretion and the procedural variations between the district 
offices. This internal codification process has been isolated from 
external influences, as the IRS has jealously resisted tax practitioners’ 
attempts to obtain codified enforcement guidelines. Additionally, the 
few political appointees to the agency are limited to the 
Commissioner’s office, with career civil servants performing the 
dominant role in shaping IRS enforcement decisions. 
The response to the Nixon administration’s attempt to use the IRS 
to harass political enemies and gather information on their activities 
demonstrates the intentional separation of the IRS’s enforcement 
powers from political influence. The agency and congressional 
supporters successfully opposed the administration’s attempt to create 
a political surveillance unit within the IRS. The Senate hearings 
investigating this surveillance unit affirmed that “the IRS is charged 
with the even-handed administration of the tax laws, and not with 
collecting files on political activity. To do so endangers not only the 
First Amendment, but public faith in the IRS and the integrity of its 
work.”80 
Concerns that elected officials might misuse the coercive powers 
of the agencies they oversee limit the efficacy of electoral controls to 
safeguard citizens from abuse. The interest in isolating the IRS from 
political influence continues to be a major factor in IRS reforms. To 
oversee IRS enforcement practices, the IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 established an independent board consisting of 
three administrative officials and several tax specialists, but no 
elected officials.81 Thus, it appears the American tax system relies 
heavily on judicial and procedural safeguards to control enforcement 
activities, isolating the IRS more so than other agencies from the 
political arena and its potential to exploit the agency. However, even 
IRS enforcement responds systematically to partisan shifts in the 
 
 80. Investigation of the Special Service Staff of the Internal Revenue Service, Political 
Intelligence in the Internal Revenue Service Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
93rd Congress 50 (1974). 
 81. See Pub L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.  
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national political system.82 Furthermore, elected officials play a major 
role in determining the scope of enforcement authority and the size of 
the enforcement staff. I will next discuss the limitation placed on 
electoral control of the IRS due to the government’s dependence on 
the IRS to provide funding for all government activities. 
A. The Continuing Quest for Efficiency  
Given the importance of government revenues to elected leaders 
and the central role of the IRS in collecting those revenues, IRS 
efficiency has remained a critical concern for the President and 
congressional committees dealing with tax issues, particularly since 
the reforms of the 1950s.83 To cope with the increasing size and 
complexity of the national economy, the IRS’s primary functions—
processing forms, examining tax returns, and collecting taxes—
evolved into three centralized divisions, each concerned with creating 
its own efficient rules, training programs, and standard operating 
procedures. Decades of political demands have reinforced the need 
for efficiency, and have shaped IRS management systems, standard 
routines, and cultures, from the national headquarters to the 
individual auditors in local field offices.  
Among the relatively autonomous divisions, the IRS has 
continued to emphasize tax return examinations. The IRS introduced 
sophisticated enforcement techniques in the 1960s that became 
models for other agencies.84 Perhaps the most famous was the “DIF 
score” method of selecting tax returns for audit based on what 
became known as the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
(TCMP).85 Sophisticated analyses of enforcement productivity played 
a dominant role in the IRS’s allocation of enforcement resources to 
district offices and enforcement tasks.86 IRS audits automatically 
 
 82. Scholz & Wood, supra note 77. 
 83. See Scholz, supra note 75, at 13. 
 84. See John T. Scholz, Managing Regulatory Enforcement in the United States, in 
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard 
Schwartz eds., 1994). 
 85. See EUGENE C. STEUERLE, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR COLLECTING TAXES? FINANCING 
THE IRS 25 (1986).  
 86. Id. at 23-24. 
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generate a measure of the additional taxes collected directly from 
audit activities, thus providing the IRS with a clear task performance 
measure that enhances the potential role of efficiency in agency 
decisions.87 The Audit Management Information System (AMIS) 
allows national and regional offices to compare dollars generated per 
hour of enforcement from different programs and district offices. At 
field offices, supervisors know the amount of taxes recovered by each 
auditor, thus exerting pressure on auditors regardless of whether any 
formal ‘quota’ system exists.  
Efficiency pressures are so embedded in the organizational culture 
of the IRS that even strong external pressures have limited ability to 
change them. For example, a 1973 directive from the IRS 
Commissioner88 and a provision of the 1988 Taxpayer Bill of Rights89 
specifically prohibited managers from evaluating employee 
performance based on the amount of revenue collected because such 
evaluations encouraged unduly zealous enforcement.90 Despite these 
repeated prohibitions, in 1998, twelve top managers and one hundred 
thirty-two other officials were reprimanded for continuing to evaluate 
employees in this manner.91 The Senate strongly condemned the 
practice in the 1997-98 Senate hearings.92 The IRS Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1998 again specified that IRS employee performance 
measures could not be based on enforcement results, dollar goals for 
assessments of collections, or any other standard that would 
undermine the fair treatment of taxpayers.93 Ironically, the combined 
impact of the Senate hearings and the IRS Restructuring and Reform 
Act of 1998 altered the culture of efficiency to the point that more 
recent press reports have expressed concern that enforcement and the 
credibility of deterrence were being undermined.94 In 2002, 
 
 87. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 160 (1989).  
 88. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Tax Professionals See Pitfalls in the New IRS, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 1999, at 21. 
 89. Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-108, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). 
 90. Johnston, supra note 86. 
 91. Id.  
 92. IRS Restructuring Hearing Before the Committee on Finance, 105th Congress (1998); 
Internal Revenue Service’s Methods Special Hearing Before the Committee on Appropriations, 
105th Congress (1998).  
 93. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.  
 94. See Johnston, supra note 86. 
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congressional concern with efficiency reemerged in General 
Accounting Office reports that confirmed the declining effectiveness 
of audits and collections since the 1998 legislation.95  
Efficiency remains a dominant concern both inside and outside the 
agency, although constrained by a growing demand for procedural 
justice. Personnel and budget cuts at all agencies during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century sharpened concerns with efficiency 
because politicians called for delivery of higher quality services by 
fewer personnel.96 The IRS’s reorganization plan for the new century, 
Compliance 2000, features productivity enhancing strategies devised 
to improve compliance with fewer IRS employees—a clear 
recognition by the IRS that its resource base is unlikely to grow in the 
near future.97  
B. The Growing Demand for Procedural Justice  
Judicial and procedural safeguards have always provided some 
counterbalance to IRS coercive powers, as noted previously. Judicial 
review by federal courts expanded with the creation of special tax 
courts, and the APA codified procedural constraints for all federal 
agencies.98 Although relatively few taxpayers go to federal court, 
court decisions nonetheless shape IRS actions.99  
Concern with adverse responses from voters and taxpayers to 
more vigorous enforcement tempers presidential and congressional 
interest in revenue maximization. This produces an IRS budget far 
short of the efficient revenue maximizing level that a private agency 
would use—every additional dollar spent on auditing would bring an 
 
 95. General Accounting Office, Potential Audit Revenues Lost While Training New 
Revenue Agents (GGD-90-77 April 6, 1990); General Accounting Office, IRS Needs More 
Reliable Information on Enforcement Revenues (GGD-90-85 June 20, 1990); General 
Accounting Office, Impact of Compliance and Collection Program Declines on Taxpayers 
(GAO-02-674 May 22, 2002). 
 96. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992). 
 97. See supra note 92. 
 98. Administrative Procedures Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701, 706, 1305, 1344, 4301, 5335, 5872, 7521).  
 99. For example, the IRS decreases audit intensity in federal districts where judges are 
most aggressive in safeguarding taxpayer rights. 
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estimated $4–$15 dollars in revenues.100 In the 1970s, Democrats 
supported the development of taxpayer assistance services within the 
IRS, showing a concrete commitment to the fair treatment of 
taxpayers. During the Reagan era, Republicans initially increased 
enforcement resources at the expense of taxpayer services to help pay 
for tax cuts. However, Republican attacks on big government and the 
tax system that supported it soon refocused attention to what they 
claimed to be an overzealous IRS, developing a “Taxpayer’s Bill of 
Rights” intended to restrain IRS enforcement practices.101 In the mid-
1990s Congress, for the first time in 30 years, refused to budget for 
the dreaded TCMP audits. Republican efforts eventually culminated 
in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 which imposed 
several major changes intended to minimize the excessive use of 
coercion and to enhance enforcement agents’ responsiveness to 
taxpayers’ needs.102 
The IRS has responded slowly but persistently to these increasing 
demands for improved procedural justice, although earlier responses 
tended to avoid any interference with enforcement.103 In response to 
the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, more fundamental 
reorganizations began emphasizing taxpayer satisfaction as much as, 
if not more than, efficient tax collection, as suggested by the newly 
adopted mission statement: “[The mission of the Service is to 
p]rovide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them 
understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax 
law with integrity and fairness to all.”104 By 2002, the Appeals 
Division and the Taxpayer Advocate Service Division reported 
directly to the IRS Commissioner. In addition, the Taxpayer 
Advocate Service must report directly to Congress—the only office in 
 
 100. STEUERLE, supra note 85, at 23-34.  
 101. Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452.  
 102. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
 103. The Taxpayer Services Division was introduced in the 1970s to assist taxpayers in 
filing their returns. Although it gradually expanded, it remained isolated from the primary 
revenue producing branches of examination and collections, and stood first in line for budget 
cuts. The Problem Resolution Program was created over a decade ago to help resolve taxpayer 
problems with the bewildering number of independent subunits involved in tax disputes and has 
become better integrated with the revenue collection functions. 
 104. IRS Mission Statement, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ors-pdf/p3385.pdf (last visited May 
12, 2003). 
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the IRS that does not report via the Department of Treasury. Within 
the IRS, new procedures, training programs, and reorganizations 
attempt to provide clearer responsibilities and incentives for resolving 
taxpayer problems.  
Given the complexity of controlling any large-scale organization, 
broad reforms intended to enhance procedural justice for taxpayers 
generally have had adverse consequences on tax collection efficiency. 
As noted above, recent attempts to constrain tax examiner and 
revenue agent coerciveness have considerably reduced the amount of 
tax cheating detected and collected per agent, thereby soliciting 
greater congressional concern with efficiency. As a result, TCMP, 
which Congress cancelled in the 1990s, was reintroduced as the 
“National Research Program.”105 This program’s information has 
been central to efficient allocation of enforcement resources.106 The 
National Research Program, however, does not reintroduce old 
procedures. Rather, it introduces a range of new techniques designed 
to gain the same level of compliance measurement using less 
intrusive methods to gather information from the randomly audited 
taxpayers.107  
In summary, the evolution of the American tax system continues 
to display the tension between efficiency and control central to 
Barzel’s contractual image of the citizen and state.108 On the one 
hand, the coercive powers of the IRS are critically important to 
ensure efficient collection of the income and payroll taxes that fund 
most government activities and are therefore valuable to citizens. On 
the other hand, the coercive powers that ensure effective collection 
also pose problems of exploitation and abuse that counterbalance 
citizens’ benefits. Now that we have completed our discussion of the 
institutional framework that has expanded the scope of rights and 
obligations in modern democracies, we next consider how modern 
citizens cope with the expanded rights and obligations of 
democracies, and particularly with the obligation to pay taxes. 
 
 105. General Accounting Office, Tax Administration: New Compliance Research Effort Is 
on Track, but Important Work Remains (GAO-02-769 June 27, 2002). 
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V. THE TAXPAYER AS ADAPTIVE CONTRACTARIAN 
Even if the American tax system reflects an institutional structure 
capable of supporting an implicit tax contract, can one really expect 
citizens to behave as rational contractarians? The contractarian 
analysis of institutions makes heroic assumptions of rationality that 
appear to be unrealistic for the analysis of taxpaying behavior. In this 
section, I develop an adaptive contractarian model based on less 
heroic assumptions of rationality as developed in political 
psychology. In this perspective, adaptive cognitive mechanisms that 
evolved to cope with the rights and obligations from other exchange 
relationships now provide the basis for coping with the rights and 
obligations in the implicit contracts between the government and its 
citizens.  
In particular, I suggest that a trust heuristic has evolved that 
facilitates individual exchange, and that in contemporary societies it 
provides the cognitive basis for adaptive contractarians to pursue 
contingent compliance with obligations imposed by the state and 
other institutions. Citizens respond to negative information relevant to 
an implicit contract by lowering trust, which, in turn, lowers the 
probability of compliance with contractual obligations. Thus, the trust 
heuristic provides safeguards on the individual level that complement 
the institutional safeguards discussed in the previous sections. 
I apply this adaptive contractarian perspective to the literature on 
tax compliance to show that the contrasting deterrence and duty 
explanations of tax compliance can be categorized as special cases of 
this more generalized approach. Fulfilling the obligation to pay taxes 
involves the same mechanisms of coercion and normative self-
enforcement involved in other contractual exchanges. I then consider 
several implications of this model for the coevolution of state 
institutions and citizen strategies, noting the functional and 
dysfunctional aspects of interactions between citizens and the 
government relating to tax compliance. Finally, I lay out research 
questions on tax compliance behavior.  
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A. The Evolution of Adaptive Contractarians 
To develop this argument, I move beyond the rational models of 
exchange generally associated with the political economy approach 
emphasized up to this point. The bounded rationality models 
associated with political psychology provide more relevant bases for 
analyzing the nature of citizens’ choices and behaviors in conditions 
associated with low information and limited attention. Under such 
circumstances, the analysis of cues and simplified heuristic processes 
provide better predictions and explanations of citizens’ behavior than 
do optimization models based on full information.109 I will begin with 
the evolutionary model of adaptive contractarians involved in basic 
exchange. I will then extend this model to exchange with groups, and 
then consider formal institutions, where rights and obligations 
become increasingly important elements of the implicit contract. 
1. Exchange and Evolution 
Cosmides and Tooby argue that exchange relationships require 
extensive cognitive tasks even in the simplest of human societies.110 
Simultaneous, equally valued exchanges (e.g., apples for oranges) are 
of limited utility since the needs and abilities of potential exchange 
partners are seldom so neatly matched. Most exchange relationships 
involve uneven exchanges that impose up-front costs in return for 
greater benefits at a later date.111 Those who master the skills required 
for such cooperative exchange relationships gain considerable 
survival benefits. The resulting increase in fitness provides 
evolutionary pressures that select special cognitive mechanisms 
 
 109. See, e.g., SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND 
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991); PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING 
AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991); Milton Lodge et al., An 
Impression-driven Model of Candidate Evaluation, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 399 (1989); ARTHUR 
LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT 
THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998).  
 110. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the 
Invisible Hand, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 327 (1994). See also DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND (1999). 
 111. For example, a successful family member may provide assistance when another 
member is in need, with the expectation that the favor will be returned if fortunes are reversed at 
some future date. 
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devoted to the resolution of exchange problems. The ability to 
recognize trading partners, to evaluate and keep track of the costs and 
benefits of trades over time, and to communicate and recognize the 
needs or preferences for both trade partners are all critical skills 
required for successful exchange.  
The vulnerability of exchange relationships to cheating is perhaps 
the greatest impediment to exchange, thus the ability to judge whether 
the exchange partner is trustworthy is a critical aspect of exchange 
related skills. Cosmides and Tooby focus on cognitive capacities that 
detect cheating to demonstrate how strong an effect exchange 
relationships have had in shaping cognitive processes.112 In laboratory 
experiments, individuals consistently demonstrate a considerably 
greater ability to solve logical problems when these problems are 
placed in the context of social exchange and presented in terms of 
receiving benefits or rights and of meeting obligations.113  
Based on a series of experiments, Cosmides and Tooby argue that 
specialized cognitive capabilities to deal with exchange problems are 
“better than rational” in the sense that these specialized mechanisms 
can solve recurrent social contract problems involving rights and 
obligations of exchange much more reliably than can more generic 
processes.114 These problem solving mechanisms provide the 
cognitive equivalent of the institutions modern society developed to 
facilitate exchange—they expand the potential for exchange while 
reducing the problem of credibility that threatens exchange 
relationships. 
Frank, from an economist’s perspective, explains how emotions or 
“moral sentiments” can play an important strategic role in resolving 
 
 112. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 110, at 329. 
 113. Id. For example, consider the problem of testing the following rule: if a person is 
drinking alcohol, then he or she must be 21 or older. Which of the following four people do you 
have to check to appropriately test the rule for cheating: someone drinking beer, someone 
drinking soda, a twenty-five year old, or a sixteen year old? When this logical problem is 
presented in more abstract terms, few people can correctly specify the appropriate test. 
However, when presented in this social contract mode, most people correctly choose the beer 
drinker, who may be under 21, and the sixteen-year-old, who may be drinking beer, as the 
critical tests for failure to obey the rule. Individuals choose the correct test even when cultural 
contexts are changed and the tested rule is unfamiliar to the individual. 
 114. Id. 
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the problem of credible commitment that is critical to exchange.115 
Recall from the previous section that the sellers’ opportunism and the 
information asymmetry between buyer and seller created formidable 
barriers to exchange in the used car example. If the seller could 
provide sufficient evidence of his or her trustworthiness, the buyer 
might trust the seller enough to proceed with the exchange. Emotions 
provide one means of judging trustworthiness. If the seller were 
endowed with emotional commitments to honesty and to fulfilling 
obligations, and if the buyer were confident that he or she could 
detect these sentiments, the buyer is more likely to believe the seller’s 
assurances that the car is not a lemon. These emotions provide costly 
signals, as they require the seller to forgo short-term gains that less 
scrupulous individuals would enjoy. Of course, emotions can only 
enhance exchanges if potential exchange partners have developed 
reliable capabilities to detect opportunistic attempts to mimic 
emotion. Frank, like Cosmides and Tooby, emphasizes that well-
developed capabilities can detect cheating and deception in others, 
which ensures that moral sentiments become “better than rational” 
when short-term interests lead to undesirable outcomes.116  
Orbell and Dawes report an experiment that demonstrates the 
potential evolutionary power of the cognitive capacities for trust and 
trustworthiness.117 Subjects chose either to play a prisoners’ dilemma 
game with an unknown player or receive a fixed payoff that was not 
as high as the cooperative payoff in the prisoners’ dilemma.118 This 
captured the critical element of choosing whether or not to exchange 
with an unknown individual. In the experiment, a large proportion of 
those who chose the exchange option also cooperated rather than 
trying to take advantage of their exchange partner.119 Orbell and 
Dawes suggest that individuals were “cognitive misers” who used a 
very simple mechanism to determine their choice—they simply 
 
 115. ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 
(1988). 
 116. Id.  
 117. John Orbell & Robyn M. Dawes, A ‘Cognitive Miser’ Theory of Cooperators’ 
Advantage, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515 (1991). 
 118. Id. at 517. 
 119. Id. at 524-26. 
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projected their own intentions onto their potential partners.120 
Trustworthy individuals were willing to trust their partner and 
therefore chose to play, while less trustworthy individuals believed 
that the partner was not trustworthy and therefore avoided the 
exchange.121 This selection mechanism ensured that trusting 
individuals primarily encountered trustworthy partners, and hence 
gained the advantages of cooperation that were lost to those unwilling 
or unable to trust others.122 In this setting of voluntary exchange, 
trustworthy partners did better than more exploitative or skeptical 
ones.123 
2. Evolution and Collective Action 
Extending the evolutionary argument to broader exchange in 
collective situations, Lubell and Scholz developed a simple cognitive 
model to explain subjects’ behavior in laboratory experiments in a 
repeated eight-person prisoner’s dilemma in which the subject played 
against seven hypothetical partners that actually were computer-
generated strategies.124 In this setting, cooperation was the optimal 
strategy for the subject when the computer-simulated partners 
reciprocated the subject’s play, but defection was optimal if the 
partners did not respond to the subject.125 The critical task for 
maximizing the subject’s payoff was to judge whether or not the other 
players were reciprocating, based solely on the record of how they 
played the game.126 Given the multiple possibilities from seven 
players responding to the subject, reciprocity testing requires intense 
cognitive effort.127 Extending the evolutionary arguments of 
Cosmedes and Tooby, Lubell and Scholz suggest that detecting 
reciprocity has been such an important aspect of human existence that 
specialized facilities have been developed specifically to test for 
 
 120. Id. at 515. 
 121. Id. at 524-26. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action 
Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160 (2001). 
 125. Id. at 162. 
 126. Id. at 164. 
 127. Id. at 162. 
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reciprocity.128  
The collective choice model they developed assumes that subjects 
conserve on costly cognitive effort by calling on this specialized 
cognitive facility only when they are surprised by the play of 
others.129 Subjects enter the game with expectations about the 
reciprocity of others in the group, and choose the optimal strategy of 
cooperation or defection in the first round based on whether or not 
they expect reciprocity.130 Subjects expecting reciprocity choose to 
cooperate and expect others to do so as well, while those expecting no 
reciprocity choose to defect and expect others to do so. If most other 
players make the expected choice in the first round, the subject is not 
surprised and continues with the initial play.131 If the subject observes 
others playing unexpected strategies, surprise triggers a reciprocity 
testing strategy over the next several rounds.132 Surprised subjects 
then test whether or not other players respond to their actions and 
adopt the optimal strategy, cooperating with reciprocating players or 
defecting with non-reciprocating players.133  
This simple model correctly predicted the observed pattern of 
play, including the two critical cases in which subjects systematically 
deviated from optimal play. First, initial cooperators continued to 
cooperate in altruistic environments where other players always 
cooperate regardless of the subject’s choice, even though the optimal 
strategy is to defect.134 Second, initial defectors continued to defect in 
reciprocal environments, where skeptical cooperators defected in the 
first round but would cooperate in response to the subject’s 
cooperation, even though the optimal strategy is to cooperate.135 The 
failure of optimal outcomes to predict observed collective exchange 
behavior underscores our need to specify the cognitive processes of 
our adaptive contractarian. Furthermore, the success of this very 
simple model in predicting behavior suggests the benefits of focusing 
 
 128. Id. at 161. 
 129. Id. at 165. 
 130. Id. at 164. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 162-63, 167. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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on a succinct model to understand compliance behavior. 
The adaptive contractarian model extends this basic collective 
action model to the broader collective action problem facing 
individuals involved in the exchange relationship with larger 
collectives, particularly modern democracies. In particular, we 
assume that “hard-wired” cognitive capacities relating to exchange, 
including collective exchange, developed prior to the current period 
in which modern institutions have increasingly superceded 
individuals as the primary partner in exchange. Citizens now maintain 
a set of expectations about institutions as well as about individuals, 
and continue their compliance or noncompliance with exchange 
obligations as long as those expectations are met.  
Both individual and historical influences shape these hard-wired 
capacities into individuals’ cognitive structures and related complex 
patterns of behavior.136 Consider first an individual’s experiential 
learning. Parents and kin who teach and respect family traditions of 
rights and responsibilities can nurture, or leave underdeveloped a 
child’s capacity for trusting and trustworthy responses.137 Individuals 
learn not only the basics of trust, rights, and obligation that are 
essential for exchange, but also learn when to trust and when to 
distrust others. Expectations and evaluations change over time in 
response to experience. In the Lubell and Scholz experiment, for 
example, subjects playing a series of games systematically changed 
their expectations in response to the reciprocity encountered in past 
games.138 Different life histories shape different cognitive structures 
and heuristic patterns, resulting in different initial expectations and 
propensities to cooperate among subjects.139  
Of course, an individual’s social and cultural milieu shapes his or 
her life history, and the society’s historical development process 
shapes the shared experiences that determine the society’s repertoire 
of citizen’s strategies. For example, most subjects in prisoner’s 
dilemma experiments tend to cooperate far beyond what game theory 
 
 136. See, e.g., ROBERT BOYD & PETER RICHERSON, CULTURE AND EVOLUTIONARY 
PROCESS (1985); DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE 
MIND (1999); Cosmedes & Tooby, supra note 110. 
 137. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL THEORY 175-96 (1990). 
 138. See Lubell & Scholz, supra note 124. 
 139. See Dawes & Orbell, supra note 117; Lubell & Scholz, supra note 124. 
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predicts, suggesting that subjects share a background rich in 
encounters with trustworthy strangers.140 Life histories may produce 
very different strategies in societies stressed by drought, increased 
poverty, ethnic violence or extended civil war.  
In sum, hard-wired cognitive capacities may provide a basis for 
developing reciprocal strategies that enhance exchange, while 
historical experiences help determine the ability to generalize 
reciprocity beyond family and small kinship groups. To better 
understand citizen responses to the rights and obligations associated 
with the state and other large-scale institutions of contemporary life, 
it is necessary to consider the coevolution of institutions and citizen 
behavior. 
B. The Coevolution of Citizens and Governing Institutions 
In the evolutionary argument, it is presumed that institutions and 
the heuristic patterns of citizenship behavior coevolve. Familiar 
patterns of rights and obligations governing simple exchanges 
provide a basis for slightly more complex patterns of rights and 
obligations developed by early institutions. These in turn provide4 a 
basis for further expansion of obligations under the state and modern 
institutions. Given the cognitive limits of citizens, a relatively small 
set of basic heuristics governs a citizen’s relationships with multiple 
individuals and institutions at each stage of this development. In order 
for citizens to cope with the growing array of governmental and other 
institutions, each of which plays a relatively small role in the citizen’s 
life, heuristics must be capable of broad generalization. Given the 
society’s repertoire of heuristics, those institutions more capable of 
enhancing the benefits of exchange tend to expand and replace less 
capable institutions. Similarly, given the society’s institutions, those 
 
 140. See Dawes & Orbell, supra note 117; Lubell & Scholz, supra note 124. Robert 
Putnam argues that the expanding array of voluntary organizations in northern Italy helped 
shape a generalized reciprocity that accounts for its enhanced economic development. ROBERT 
PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993). 
Experiences in one voluntary organization established patterns of reciprocity that other 
organizations could then exploit. Id. The more authoritarian traditions in southern Italy did not 
develop the same level of “social capital,” thus creating a less fertile ground for the 
development of economic organizations. Id. 
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individuals whose heuristics are best suited to the dominant 
institutions will prosper compared to those individuals less suited.141 
The result is that institutions and citizen behavior are intricately 
interrelated in what North has called a path-dependent 
development.142 To understand the heuristics involved in a citizen’s 
decision whether or not to comply with obligations associated with 
these institutions—specifically tax obligations—I will begin with the 
better developed analysis of the heuristic basis for a citizen’s voting 
behavior. 
1. Voting Heuristics and Institutional Evaluations  
The adaptive contractarian perspective argues that attitudes toward 
institutions play the same efficient cognitive role in compliance 
behavior that attitudes toward candidates play in voting choice. 
Laboratory experiments demonstrate that subjects assimilate 
information about candidates into their basic “affect,” or liking for the 
candidate, and increase their liking for candidates who are more 
sympathetic to their concerns.143 The assimilation process is based on 
the well-developed theory of cognitive consistency in adaptive 
attitude change, in which exposure to positive stimuli causes positive 
adaptation in the most closely related sets of attitudes, and exposure 
to larger stimuli causes greater changes in these attitudes.144 Thus, 
voting choice is based on the subject’s liking of the candidate which 
reflects the resulting aggregation of information: the more likeable 
the candidate, the more likely the subject is willing to exchange his or 
her vote for the candidate’s promised performance. This voting 
heuristic provides a potentially efficient cognitive mechanism for 
making “rational” voting choices for relatively insignificant 
exchanges because this mechanism minimizes the initial need to store 
information and to consciously recall and process stored information 
when making the voting choice. Voters evaluate candidates by using 
attitudes about candidates to store information “on line,” and then use 
 
 141. See BOYD & RICHARDSON, supra note 136. 
 142. See NORTH, supra note 13. 
 143. See Lodge et al., supra note 109. 
 144. See Anthony R. Pratkanis, The Cognitive Representation of Attitudes, in ATTITUDE 
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS (A. R. Pratkanis et al. ed., 1989).  
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the summary evaluation when required to vote or answer survey 
questions about the candidates.145 
Widespread evidence exists that evaluations play a similar role in 
mediating the exchange between citizens and institutions in society, 
providing a basis for conditional compliance with obligations relating 
to institutions.146 Individuals respond to adverse impacts by lowering 
favorable attitudes, commitments, and willingness to obey obligations 
to these institutions.147  
2. Distributive and Procedural Evaluations of Institutions 
A particularly important dimension emerges from these and 
similar studies that is central to the hierarchical nature of citizens’ 
relationships with institutions. In hierarchical contracts between 
individuals and complex institutions, individuals agree to give the 
institution the right to interpret the implicit contract when 
disagreements arise.148 In the context of employer-employee 
relations, for example, ambiguities and uncertainties about the future 
may limit the ability of workers and firms to completely specify a 
useful employment contract.149 Since negotiating costs would be 
prohibitive if every decision about an employee’s job had to be 
negotiated, employees accede authority to the employer to interpret 
the contract.150 Employees will meet their obligations under such 
hierarchical contracts only as long as they believe the employer will 
serve the employees’ long-term interests.151  
Kreps argues that employees’ assessments of long-term interests 
 
 145. See Lodge et al., supra note 109. 
 146. See Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegal, Understanding the Interaction Between 
Procedural and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: 
FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 393 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) 
(reviewing empirical studies of citizen responses to orders from police and courts, and of 
employee responses to layoffs, pay freezes, relocations, drug-testing policies, and smoking 
bans; and finding the impact of these policies affected the individual’s citizenship behavior, 
organizational commitment, job performance, and turnover intention). 
 147. Id. 
 148. David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90-143 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990). 
 149. See KREPS, supra note 27, at 581-614. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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are based on the “corporate culture” that defines the expected 
employment benefit as well as the procedures and principles to be 
used in adjudicating disputes over these benefits.152 This corporate 
culture constrains managerial decisions and provides consistent 
decision-making by multiple specialized managers that the employee 
may encounter in complex organizations.153 In evaluating a corporate 
decision, distributive justice refers to the congruence between 
observed benefits and expectations based on the corporate culture. 
Similarly, procedural justice refers to the congruence between 
observed procedures and principles and expectations based on the 
corporate culture. Because employees cannot expect every disputed 
benefit to be decided in their favor, the evaluation of decision lacking 
distributional justice relies heavily on the evaluation of procedural 
justice.154 For the rational contractarian implicit in Kreps’s approach, 
procedural justice can mitigate the inevitable disappointments with 
distributional justice, maintaining the hierarchical contracts that the 
employee would otherwise abandon. 
Empirical studies confirm that procedural justice plays as strong a 
role as distributional justice in determining a participant’s willingness 
to comply with a given organizational decision.155 Absent procedural 
justice, favorable outcomes significantly increase compliance with 
organizational decisions.156 However, high procedural justice scores 
may compensate for adverse outcomes when assessing decision 
compliance.157 Many studies indicate that favorable evaluations of 
procedural justice lead to smaller and more insignificant differences 
in compliance between favorable and unfavorable outcomes.158  
In these studies, procedural justice evaluations included: 
determinations of whether the individual was allowed to participate in 
or was adequately represented in the process; whether decisions were 
clearly explained, adequately justified, and implemented consistently; 
and whether the process treated the individual with respect and 
 
 152. Kreps, supra note 148, at 90-143. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. See Brockner & Siegel, supra note 146. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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dignity.159 The values reflected in these determinations appear to be 
widespread in modern societies. From the adaptive contractarian 
perspective, they provide a set of widely-accepted expectations 
governing hierarchical contracts between citizens and large-scale 
public and private organizations. Given the difficulties in accurately 
assessing the relative costs and benefits of exchanges with such 
organizations, procedural justice evaluations provide a proxy for 
evaluating whether long-term benefits exceed the costs of complying 
with obligations imposed by the organization. Assessing the benefits 
and costs the tax system imposes on individuals is particularly 
difficult, even for economists. Particularly when the expected costs 
and benefits associated with distributional justice are too difficult to 
track, procedural justice provides an alternative means of evaluating 
whether or not an institution is performing to expectations, and hence 
provides an additional contingency in deciding whether or not to 
fulfill related obligations.  
One puzzling feature of procedural justice studies is the weight 
given to personal encounters between citizens and individual police 
officers and judges in determining citizens’ perceptions about the 
police and the court system as institutions. It appears that the personal 
traits of a police officer are more important than the police officer’s 
authority in influencing an individual’s compliance with obligations 
to these institutions.160 Although from a rational perspective this 
influence appears puzzling, it is not particularly surprising when 
examined from the adaptive contractarian evolutionary perspective. 
Hierarchical relationships are not new to modern societies.161 As a 
holdover from earlier face-to-face forms of hierarchical contracts, it is 
not surprising that contemporary individuals’ heuristics continue to 
emphasize individual encounters when evaluating institutions. This 
evolutionary argument explains more generally why people tend to 
overlook statistical information about organizations and focus instead 
on concrete stories that they can more readily evaluate.162  
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Family structures impose an obligation on followers to obey family leadership in 
return for the rights that are protected by the leader. Patron-client relationships in agricultural 
societies demonstrate a similar hierarchical exchange pattern. 
 162. See Martha S. Feldman & James G March, Information In Organizations As Signal 
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While the heavy emphasis individuals place on personal 
characteristics of police officers may be a dysfunctional vestige in 
some circumstances, holding the institution accountable for its 
employee’s action has a clear functional benefit distinct from the 
overall cost and benefit balance associated with the institution. 
Contingent compliance based on overall costs and benefits associated 
with an institution provides the rational contractarian with a primary 
defense against institutional exploitation. Procedural justice concerns, 
on the other hand, provide a secondary defense for adaptive 
contractarians by giving enforcement agencies an incentive to 
minimize exploitative tactics. As noted, the general solution to 
countering exploitation by fragmenting power into multiple agencies 
shifts the control problem to these secondary agencies. Without a 
method of control, agencies are tempted to shift much of the 
enforcement burden onto citizens. To the extent that adaptive 
contractarians hold agencies accountable for procedural justice, the 
resulting contingency provides a counterincentive to agencies and 
their judicial and elected oversight institutions—if enforcement 
techniques clash with procedural justice expectations, willingness to 
comply with the agency will decline. Thus, the greater problem in 
gaining compliance from adaptive contractarians will offset the 
agency’s desire to shift greater burdens to citizens. Because 
individuals will respond adversely to negative encounters, 
contingency based on procedural justice would also reward 
organizations that could best reduce these negative encounters.  
3. Cognitive Structure and the Adaptive Contractarian 
The model of the citizen as an adaptive contractarian suggests that 
people fulfill obligations to institutions that provide long-term 
benefits in excess of the short-term costs. As with individual 
exchanges, the adaptive contractarian monitors the exchange 
relationship through adaptive attitudes toward the institution and the 
obligations it imposes. Good outcomes or positive evidence of 
procedural justice provide positive increases in these attitudes, while 
poor outcomes or negative evidence lead to negative changes in 
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attitudes. These attitudes, in turn, affect the likelihood that the 
individual will fulfill his or her obligations to the organization. 
Attitude monitors produce a contingency strategy in which the 
fulfillment of obligations depends on how well the institution upholds 
the individual’s rights and produces the expected benefits. 
The evolutionary approach assumes that adaptive contractarians 
use cognitive mechanisms, but does not assume that these 
mechanisms provide optimal controls over all coercive enforcement 
agencies. There are limits to the range of adaptations any individual 
can undertake to optimize exchange with every potential institution. 
Indeed, adaptive attitudes are likely to lead to systematic errors, just 
as adaptive expectations led to suboptimal choices for individuals in 
the Lubell and Scholz model. Gains in cognitive efficiency generally 
involve losses in accuracy for specific decisions, because decisions 
that are right under most circumstances can, occasionally, be 
wrong.163  
One approach to understanding the limited ability of adaptive 
contractarians to control coercive enforcement agencies is based on 
the widely accepted principle that cognitive structures consist of both 
relatively stable, generalized core values that affect very broad realms 
of behavior, and more adaptive, specialized beliefs and attitudes 
associated with specific behaviors and institutions.164 Core values 
change relatively slowly, in part because they provide the basis for 
interpreting new experiences. The cognitive consistency hypothesis 
suggests that information inconsistent with core values will have 
relatively less impact on, and will be interpreted in ways more 
consistent with, existing beliefs.165 Thus, core values provide stable 
behavior. As Frank argued, it is this stability of moral commitments 
that provides credibility for exchange relationships—an individual 
who keeps his or her word in one relationship is likely to do so in 
other relationships.166 
Although core values adapt to unexpected experiences very 
slowly, adaptation takes place more rapidly for specialized beliefs 
 
 163. See JOHN. W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 72-75 (1993). 
 164. Pratkanis, supra note 144. 
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and attitudes.167 The more important the behavior or institution to the 
individual, the more nuanced the specialized set of beliefs and 
attitudes addressing that behavior or institution will be.168 These 
specialized beliefs and attitudes enable individuals to monitor 
relationships with different institutions and respond appropriately to 
each institution.169 Thus, individuals who comply with obligations to 
many government agencies may not comply with a particular agency 
that has treated them poorly. Specialization comes at a price if 
cognitive capability is limited; the greater the resources spent 
monitoring one agency, the fewer that remain to monitor others. To 
conserve monitoring resources, an individual could aggregate 
experiences from one agency into his or her attitudes affecting the 
entire set of agencies. For inconsequential obligations to unknown 
agencies, core values might suffice as a behavioral guide. Efficient 
cognitive mechanisms balance the costs of developing more 
specialized monitors with the potential risks and benefits involved in 
the exchange relationship. For example, taxpayers confronting a 
greater range of choices that have greater variance in expected costs 
and benefits would presumably have more specialized monitoring 
attitudes that differ substantially from the core values and attitudes 
they hold for other agencies.  
Unfortunately, we know very little about individuals’ cognitive 
structures for state obligations. Understanding these structures will 
provide insight about several important issues relating to citizens and 
their state obligations. For example, it would clarify the question of 
the extent to which negative experiences with one government agency 
destroy the legitimacy of other government agencies and ultimately of 
the government itself.170 Understanding the stability versus 
adaptability of specialized attitudes is particularly important in 
understanding the stability of contractual compliance. An adaptation 
that is too slow will provide too little restraint on an aggressive state 
agency. In Barzel’s scenario discussed in section II, a slow response 
 
 167. John T. Scholz et al., Will Taxpayers Ever Like Taxes? Responses to the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act, 13 J. ECON. PSYCH. 625 (1992). 
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by citizens to minor exploitation would lead to excessive exploitation, 
and eventually to the emergence of a dictatorship. An adaptation that 
is too rapid, on the other hand, would not allow the state sufficient 
time to correct unpopular changes in tax laws or administration 
before the cooperative equilibrium would collapse.  
C. Tax Compliance and the Adaptive Contractarians 
The literature on tax compliance has generally ignored the 
potential role of the adaptive contractarian, focusing instead on the 
role of deterrence or social influences in explaining compliance 
behavior. To clarify how these different approaches are related and 
why there is considerable skepticism about a contractual approach to 
tax compliance, consider again the basic problem of the provision of 
public goods. If no one pays for community activities, the benefits of 
community life and government will be forfeited. Despite this, all 
taxpayers would individually be better off free riding. Even if all 
taxpayers recognized the disastrous consequences of free riding, no 
single individual’s decision not to free ride could change other 
individuals’ free riding incentives because an individual choice not to 
free ride appears only to increase the benefits of free riding for others 
in the community. One must ask what an intelligent taxpayer should 
do when faced with this conflict between individual and collective 
rationality, and how government can help create for taxpayers a 
credible commitment allowing them to resolve this problem. 
Figure 1 presents this problem graphically, using the display 
introduced by Schelling.171 Figure 1 depicts a society in which 
everyone pays the same tax, and benefits equally from government 
expenditures.172  
 
 171. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 110-15 (1978). 
 172. The horizontal axis represents the proportion of the population that pays taxes, which 
ranges from 0% on the left when nobody pays to 100% on the right when everyone pays. The 
vertical axis represents the taxpayer’s utility or payoff, with higher values being more preferred. 
We assume in this diagram that a taxpayer pays either the full tax or free rides and pays no tax, 
and that the benefits from government services are the same whether the taxpayer pays or not. 
The upper line in Figure 1 gives the payoffs for free riding, while the lower line gives the 
payoffs for those who pay their taxes. Schelling notes that the strategy of free riding guarantees 
at least the minimal payoff the citizen could receive if there were no government to collect 
taxes, which is represented by the zero point on the payoff axis. Id. This is where the free rider 
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 FIGURE 1: Payoffs for Free Riders and Honest Taxpayers in the Tax Dilemma
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This diagram shows that the benefits of paying or not paying taxes 
depend primarily on how many other citizens pay their taxes. The 
classic free rider problem is evident from the diagram: no matter how 
many other people pay, the payoff for free riding is always greater 
than the payoff for paying taxes. Without additional incentives, free 
riding would be the dominant choice and the government would be 
unable to provide a public good. As noted previously, there are many 
 
payoff line crosses the horizontal axis. The taxpayer receives the same public good as the free 
rider but pays tax “T.” If nobody else pays taxes, the lone taxpayer would lose the amount of tax 
he paid, represented by -T in the figure, because he paid his taxes but received no public good in 
exchange. On the other hand, if everyone pays taxes, the payoff for those paying taxes rises to 
“G,” the average value of the public good resulting from paying taxes. As indicated, free riders 
are better off because they receive the public good although they did not have to pay for it. 
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collective action mechanisms that resolve this problem in a 
continuing game. For example, if all taxpayers will pay their taxes as 
long as everyone else pays, but will never again pay taxes if any 
single taxpayer free rides, then an equilibrium strategy would be to 
always pay taxes. The short-term advantage of free riding would be 
overshadowed by the loss of future benefits. Of course, this scenario 
would be implausible in modern societies, particularly for an income 
tax system that involves millions of diverse taxpayers filing complex 
and private tax returns.173  
Thus, the tax system resembles the marketplace in that it 
establishes exchange relationships among autonomous individuals 
with little basis for self-enforcing agreements. Like the marketplace, 
it appears that the coercive enforcement powers of the state are 
critical for enforcing any agreement to provide public goods. Thus, 
the tax compliance literature has largely ignored the possibility of 
self-enforcing contractual conditions in favor of two exogenous 
solutions: the deterrence approach, which relies on the coercive 
powers of the state; and the duty approach, which relies on moral or 
social obligations to the state. 
1. The Deterrence Approach  
The deterrence approach emphasizes the state provision of 
coercive enforcement to ensure compliance with legal obligations. 
Tax collection agencies such as the IRS use coercive powers to 
impose fines and, ultimately, to seize salaries and property, in order 
to counterbalance the temptation to free ride. As long as the expected 
penalty for free riding outweighs the gain from not paying taxes, 
rational taxpayers will meet their legal obligations.  
Figure 2 portrays an optimal deterrence outcome in which society 
has invested in a tax collection agency to the extent that deterring one 
additional taxpayer from free riding would cost more than the tax 
collected.174 
 
 173. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982). Hardin argues that the belief that 
one individual’s free riding behavior can influence the behavior of the rest of society is logically 
implausible. Id. 
 174. If taxpayers make up x percent of the population, then taxpayers receive g(x)-e-t, the 
value of public goods g(x) minus the enforcement cost e per capita and the tax t. Free riders 
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FIGURE 2: Payoffs in Tax Dilemma with Enforcement Costs 
-40 
-20 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Percentage of Honest Taxpayers
Pa
yo
ff  
Constrained Free Rider
Honest Taxpayer with
Enforcement Costs
Equilibrium 
Compliance 
Level 
X 
 Figure 2 assumes that taxpayers in different economic 
circumstances differ in their ability to cheat without getting caught 
and therefore face different expected penalties. Taxpayers are ranked 
by expected penalty, with those expecting the highest penalty located 
to the left of those expecting lower penalties.175 Figure 2 also assumes 
that at optimal levels of deterrence, taxes will still exceed the 
expected penalty for free riding for some taxpayers, who will 
consequently choose to free ride.176 Thus, at equilibrium, X on the 
 
now receive g(x)-e-p, the same g(x)-e that taxpayers receive minus the expected penalty p. 
 175. Thus, the payoff for constrained free riders will be lowered more on the left that on the 
right in comparison with the unconstrained free rider payoffs. Note that the fixed positions for 
different taxpayers differs from the original Schelling diagrams. 
 176. If x>X then t>p(x). 
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horizontal axis represents the percentage of taxpayers who will 
comply because of the deterrence threat. The payoff for taxpayers just 
equal the payoff for the constrained free-riders, since both will 
receive the public goods provided by tax service, and the expected 
penalties just equal the tax to be paid. This payoff is better than the 
zero payoff associated with the complete lack of government services 
in the society portrayed in Figure 1, although the cost of the 
enforcement agency reduces the total public goods produced. 
Deterrence studies provide empirical evidence that the probability 
of detection is significantly related to compliance with legal 
obligations.177 However, the evidence is surprisingly inconsistent, 
particularly in the tax compliance arena.178 The clearest evidence in 
the tax arena is that compliance is highest among individuals whose 
income is reported directly to the IRS, giving these individuals little 
opportunity to cheat.179 Reporting wage income dates back at least to 
the early withholding laws introduced during World War II. In the 
last two decades, Congress has mandated new reporting systems for 
interest, rental, and other forms of income.180 At the same time, the 
IRS has improved the computer matching systems to verify that tax 
return information is consistent with third party reports.181  
Even with broader authority and better computer capabilities, 
however, third parties fully reported to the IRS only about three-
fourths of the total income that taxpayers reported in the large sample 
of taxpayers we studied.182 Auditing tax returns remains the primary 
enforcement tool for ensuring full reporting of this remaining income, 
 
 177. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Organizing for Deterrence: Lessons From A Study of 
Child Support, L. & SOC. REV. 511 (1982); John T. Scholz & Wayne B. Gray, OSHA 
Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment, 3 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 283 (1990). 
 178. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. ROTH ET AL., TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR 
RESEARCH (1989); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818 (1998). For 
more recent research see Mihri Mete, Bureaucratic Behavior in Strategic Environments: 
Politicians, Taxpayers, and the IRS, 64 J. OF POLITICS 384 (2002). 
 179. See Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in TAXPAYER 
COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 107 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 
1989). 
 180. See Scholz, supra note 75. 
  181. ROTH ET AL., supra note 178.  
 182. John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis 
of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (1995). 
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and the relationship between tax audits and compliance is relatively 
weak and inconsistent.  
Perhaps more problematic from the deterrence perspective, 
taxpayers have very inaccurate beliefs about the likelihood that the 
IRS will audit them. Scholz and Pinney found that only some 
taxpayers with considerable opportunity to cheat knew anything 
about their likelihood of getting caught.183 If audits do have some 
deterrent effect on the average taxpayer, deterrence clearly does not 
work through a conscious compliance calculus. The inconsistent 
impact of audits, coupled with the general lack of knowledge 
taxpayers possess about audit probabilities, suggest that deterrence is 
limited to a relatively small population of taxpayers who have no 
sense of contractual obligation.  
Despite the deterrence approach’s empirical weakness, it enjoys 
considerable popularity and influence because of its logical appeal 
and clear advice regarding efficient enforcement systems and 
policies. For example, deterrence theory indicates that an 
enforcement agency reaches its optimal size when the increase in tax 
revenue from one additional dollar invested in enforcement will raise 
one additional dollar in collected revenue.184 Similarly, an optimal 
allocation of enforcement resources to all taxpayer groups should 
ensure equal marginal returns from each group, even though this may 
require concentrating enforcement activities on taxpayer groups with 
relatively high compliance levels if it is more expensive to deter tax 
payer groups with low compliance levels. Furthermore, the most 
efficient tax system would minimize enforcement costs by taxing 
only income for which cheating is readily observable, thereby 
providing the maximum probability of detection per investment in 
enforcement and the best ratio of revenue per dollar invested. 
However, important features of the American tax system are 
incongruous with these deterrence solutions. First, Congress has 
never been willing to invest in enforcement activities to the level at 
which one additional dollar expended would bring in one additional 
dollar in revenue. Estimates suggest that every dollar invested in 
additional audits would bring in ten to twelve dollars in direct 
 
 183. Id. 
 
 184. See STEUERLE, supra note 85, at 24-25. 
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collections, in addition to any added deterrence effect the audits 
would generate.185 Second, audits are not allocated efficiently across 
audit classes.186 Finally, the U.S. Tax Code is horribly long and 
complicated, and clearly not designed to address efficient 
enforcement. While the government has paid considerable attention to 
simplifying the taxpaying process and lowering compliance costs to 
taxpayers, there have been no serious proposals to only tax readily 
observable income. Far from canceling taxes on unobservable 
income, as efficient enforcement might suggest, the IRS focuses 
considerable attention on maintaining enforcement mechanisms in 
this area, despite its high costs and difficulties. 
One reason that deterrence theory appears ineffective for 
predicting the shape and concerns of the tax system is that it 
completely ignores both the problem of controlling enforcement 
authorities and the concern with fairness and the production of public 
goods that are critical to the adaptive contractarian. In fact, the 
deterrence perspective appears more appropriate for a dictator 
interested in maximal extraction of taxes than for a democracy 
concerned with the enforcement of rights and obligations intended to 
expand the welfare of its citizens. 
2. The Duty Approach 
The major alternative to deterrence theory argues that 
contemporary societies resolve the collective action problem by 
internalizing social norms and legal obligations in the form of a duty 
to obey.187 If during childhood, individuals are socialized to obey 
parents, school, and the state, then the guilt an individual would feel 
and the resulting social approbation for breaking the law could offset 
the noncompliance gain.188 The pleasure and social approval 
 
 185. Id. at 25.  
 186. Id. See also Scholz & Wood, supra note 78. 
 187. See, e.g., ROTH ET AL., supra note 178. 
 188. Democratic enfranchisement and effective political participation enhances the 
likelihood that a society will develop strong norms of citizenship duty. See GABRIEL A. 
ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN 
FIVE NATIONS, AN ANALYTIC STUDY (1965). Thus, countries with supportive civic cultures in 
which citizens are willing to grant legitimacy to the government and its laws presumably have a 
higher equilibrium, X, and hence a greater capacity to provide collective goods than in countries 
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individuals derive from performing their duties provides an additional 
positive motive for individuals to comply with legal obligations.189 As 
noted, the duty to obey consists of two components: externally 
imposed social approbation and internalized guilt or pride. Because it 
requires no external monitoring, internalized guilt is the more 
efficient component. It is also the most relevant for income tax 
compliance behavior, as tax information and the results of IRS audits 
are legally protected from public disclosure. 
Assuming that the socialization process varies in effectiveness, the 
dashed line in Figure 2 could also portray the affect of guilt and social 
approbation on free rider payoffs.190 As with the deterrence theory, an 
equilibrium level X of compliance results with taxpayers to the left of 
X choosing to comply because guilt and social approbation would be 
more costly than the tax they might otherwise be tempted to avoid. 
Taxpayers to the right of X would still free ride, as guilt would not be 
sufficient to overcome the temptation to avoid tax.  
In this interpretation of Figure 2, the system does not incur the 
cost of maintaining an enforcement authority, but instead incurs the 
cost of developing a duty to obey tax laws through the socialization 
process. This long term investment in socialization may be more or 
less costly than maintaining an enforcement agency. It is, however, of 
considerably greater value because a sense of duty is likely to affect 
other non-tax legal obligations that would be unaffected by tax 
enforcement. However, the relative effectiveness of guilt, as 
compared to deterrence, in encouraging compliance with legal 
obligations is of considerable debate. 
On a practical level, taxpaying provides perhaps the most critical 
arena for testing the role that duty plays in resolving the free rider 
problem. Few observers are willing to believe that even the most 
patriotic citizens will pay their taxes out of a sense of civic duty 
alone. Duty might be a more plausible motivation for obeying laws 
that have clear, desired outcomes and relatively low obedience 
 
in which citizens have not developed this internalized motivation for obeying legal obligations. 
Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. For this interpretation taxpayers are sorted such that those with the greatest inhibition 
are placed to the left. 
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costs.191 The benefits derived from tax supported government 
activities may be substantial, but the costs of paying income tax are 
so clear and concrete compared to these diffuse, distant, and abstract 
benefits that the benefits probably appear irrelevant to most 
taxpayers.192 
Tax studies consistently find that both internalized guilt and social 
approbation are highly correlated with self-reported compliance 
behavior, which supports the duty perspective.193 Of course, critics of 
the duty approach generally argue that this relationship reflects self-
justification rather than motivation.194 Critics contend that taxpayers 
decide whether or not to cheat based on the self-interested 
compliance calculus, and then adjust their beliefs to be consistent 
with their decision.195 Thus, cheaters report that they feel little guilt, 
while compliers report that they would feel very guilty if they 
cheated. However, Scholz and Pinney’s study demonstrates that 
deterrence related beliefs are shaped more by the taxpayers’ sense of 
guilt than by their objective risks of being caught cheating.196 
The socialization theory of duty, like the deterrence theory, 
ignores the problem of controlling the authority that imposes legal 
obligations, particularly in dynamic modern societies in which 
governments constantly revise legal obligations. If duty is simply a 
stable personality trait, then blindly obedient citizens will still obey 
laws that usurpers, who exploit democratic institutions to gain power, 
impose. Furthermore, free riders could easily exploit such honest 
citizens. In societies populated by duty-bound citizens, electoral 
controls would have to be much stronger than those that exist in 
electoral systems.197  
 
 191. For example, recycling laws have successfully reduced solid waste despite the lack of 
enforcement agencies. A.E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2001). Tax laws, 
however, have little of the direct positive value that individuals may possess when they obey 
environmental laws. 
 192. See DAVID O. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN 
CALIFORNIA (1982). 
 193. See ROTH ET AL., supra note 178. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. This argument reflects, in part, the well-established sociological literature on 
deviant behavior and cognitive consistency in which association with other like-minded 
individuals is considered an important ingredient in maintaining deviant behavior. 
 196. See Scholz & Pinney, supra note 182. 
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D. Taxpayers as Adaptive Contractarians 
The adaptive contractarian model integrates the concerns of 
deterrence and duty theories, but emphasizes the problem of 
simultaneously controlling other taxpayers and the state’s coercive 
powers. The adaptive contractarian will meet obligations to pay taxes, 
but only if other taxpayers and the state also meet their obligations to 
the implicit tax contract. It shares with the deterrence perspective the 
assumption that some taxpayers require coercion to meet their 
obligation. It also shares with the duty perspective the assumption 
that compliance, in democracies, is driven primarily by a moral 
commitment to meet social and legal obligations. This moral 
commitment is like the concept of duty, except that for the adaptive 
contractarian the commitment is contingent on both the performance 
of the state and of other taxpayers. In short, under the adaptive 
contractarian approach, Figure 2 can still be used to analyze 
compliance, but all the lines are interdependent. By focusing on these 
interdependencies, the resulting model becomes considerably more 
relevant both as a behavioral and a normative theory of taxpaying and 
enforcement.  
1. Contingent Compliance and the State 
The most important and most obvious implication of the adaptive 
contractarian model is that the population’s willingness to obey tax 
obligations can significantly reduce the need for coercive 
enforcement techniques if the associated benefits justify conditional 
compliance. Consider, for example, the difference between 
democracies and dictatorships. The democratic citizens would receive 
more benefits from tax revenue than would citizens in a dictatorship 
because dictators are unlikely to use tax revenues to benefit the 
public. Since duty is proportionate to benefits, citizens in democracies 
would also have a greater sense of duty. Thus, contingent compliance 
based on duty should be substantially higher in democracies. Indeed, 
levels of duty are likely to be low enough in dictatorships that no 
portion of the population would comply without a deterrence 
 
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/5
p139 Scholz.doc  9/23/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]   Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax 191 
 
mechanism.  
In short, contingent compliance provides a second line of defense, 
after elections, to minimize the problem of state exploitation and to 
increase wealth enhancing policies. To the extent that democracies 
produce higher public benefits that translate into higher levels of 
commitment, democracies will sustain higher levels of tax 
compliance with less expenditure on enforcement. By minimizing 
investment in coercion, a society of adaptive contractarians lowers 
the coercion problem and, hence, the reliance on other collective 
action mechanisms to control state enforcement agencies. Because 
dictatorships produce fewer public goods in exchange for tax 
payments, they have little alternative other than investing heavily in a 
coercive tax collection system. 
Furthermore, contingency based on procedural justice provides the 
tax collector and the oversight institutions with a direct motivation to 
be concerned about tax collection’s intrusiveness and taxpayers’ 
attitudes about the collection agency. The evolutionary mechanisms 
that generate concerns with procedural justice may be more important 
for the tax collector than for most other specialized enforcement 
agencies. Given the considerable difficulty in tracking the benefits 
received from all income tax supported policies, willingness to 
comply with income tax may be considerably more responsive to 
changes in procedural justice than to changes in tax costs and 
benefits.198 
This discussion suggests that several questions must be answered 
to confirm the adaptive contractarian’s approach to tax compliance. 
Most importantly, one must ask if American taxpayers track policy 
benefits versus costs by altering their attitudes about tax obligations 
and if these attitudes also track procedural issues. Given the relevance 
 
 198. Consider, for example, the problem of controlling deductions for the business use of 
an automobile. This deduction provides a strong temptation for salesmen to deduct mileage 
actually used for personal use, a well-known compliance problem. When Congress directed the 
IRS to promulgate rules limiting this abuse, the IRS enacted cumbersome recordkeeping 
requirements. The deterrence approach would suggest that these recordkeeping requirements 
would be relatively effective in controlling abuse. However, many taxpayers felt these 
requirements were overly intrusive and cumbersome. To the extent that adaptive contractarians 
respond to such procedural justice issues, overall compliance with this and other tax issues 
would have also declined, thereby increasing enforcement costs and providing the IRS with 
incentives to avoid imposing costly bookkeeping requirements on taxpayers. 
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and observability issues in cognitive processing, one would expect 
changes in procedural issues to account for much of the variance in 
obligation, with tax changes taking a close second and policy benefit 
changes a distant third. Furthermore, one would expect that the 
contractual constraints on enforcement powers discussed in section II 
have coevolved with individual’s cognitive structures. Although the 
purpose of these constraints is clear from the contractual perspective, 
it is less clear how these constraints connect to citizens’ assessments 
of the tax collection system. One must ask to what extent, and 
through which mechanisms, these constraints directly enhance 
contingent compliance. 
Another important question is raised concerning the rate of 
adaptation when individuals have adverse experiences. A slow 
response by taxpayers produces less effective controls over the 
general government as well as over the tax collector’s actions. A 
rapid response, on the other hand, may leave insufficient time for the 
elected and oversight institutions to respond. After all, electoral and 
oversight mechanisms are relatively clumsy and lumbering devices to 
correct perceived governmental excesses likely to trigger 
noncompliance—excesses such as an erosion of policy benefits, ill-
advised tax increases, or unduly aggressive tax collection actions. 
Cooperative equilibria supported by contingent compliance can be 
very fragile and difficult to recover once destroyed. A critical 
question, then, is whether adaptive contractarians can react rapidly 
enough to control government excesses without bringing about a 
collapse in the tax system.  
2. Contingent Compliance and Other Citizens 
As in all other contractual arenas, the critical function of the 
state’s tax enforcement power is to assure adaptive contractarians that 
other citizens will meet their contractual obligations, assuring the 
adaptive contractarian that he or she is not foolish in meeting these 
same obligations. Thus, for the average adaptive contractarian in a 
society where most people pay their taxes, the state’s deterrence 
power is more important for the assurance it provides about the 
behavior of others than it is for the fear it inspires in the contractarian.  
This relationship between deterrence and duty is perhaps best 
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reflected in Bowles’s observation about compliance with wartime 
price control regulations.199 He noted that five percent of regulated 
businesses would comply regardless of whether or not the agency did 
anything, because they had a deep sense of obligation.200 
Approximately another ten percent will not comply despite the 
agency’s best enforcement efforts.201 The remaining businesses will 
comply only if the agency makes a serious effort to find and punish 
the ten percent who will not comply.202 
The adaptive contractarian model suggests that both duty and 
deterrence determine the equilibrium level of compliance in Figure 2. 
The higher the resulting equilibrium, the greater the payoff will be 
from public goods, and hence the greater the likelihood that 
obligation, rather than fear, will provide the adaptive contractarian’s 
primary motivation. Thus, in societies with high percentages of 
citizens who pay tax primarily because of duty, deterrence will make 
up only a small portion of the inhibitors illustrated in Figure 2. 
Indeed, as suggested by Bowles, the prime focus for deterrence would 
only be on those taxpayers close to the equilibrium point X.203 By 
targeting noncompliers and those near the margin for enforcement, 
the state can expect considerable returns from modest enforcement 
expenditures. This not only reduces the cost of collecting taxes, but, 
perhaps most importantly, reduces the problem of controlling more 
extensive use of the state’s coercive powers. Thus, the apparent 
underinvestment in audit resources discussed previously is more 
consistent with the adaptive contractarian model—an optimal 
investment would need to be calculated based on the marginal 
increase in assurance rather than in taxes collected by the audits. 
In a society of adaptive contractarians, while the assurance 
function of deterrence considerably reduces the cost of enforcement, 
it also exacerbates the problem of the unstable compliance levels that 
result if adaptive contractarians respond too rapidly. In particular, 
declines in either the cost-benefit calculus or in the perceived 
 
 199. CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1941-1969 
(1971). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. 
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effectiveness of deterrence have a multiplier effect, because resulting 
reduced compliance levels will induce a secondary reduction in 
obligation. As compliance declines, government benefits and the duty 
to obey would also decline, leading to a renewed cycle of declining 
compliance. If adaptation is sufficiently rapid, the government’s 
legitimacy could completely collapse, leading adaptive contractarians 
to comply only to the extent that remaining deterrence threats force 
compliance. Consider, for example, adaptive contractarians who 
comply only until a trigger condition is reached. Add to this model a 
democratic government with controls that keep a rough equilibrium 
between public opinion and elected officials’ policies.204 Such a 
mismatch between citizens’ behavior and institutions would lead to 
frequent trigger conditions followed by long periods of 
noncompliance.  
This problem of sustaining equilibrium in uncertain environments 
is not well understood. The analytic game theory approach is not very 
useful. On the one hand, Hardin points out that the logical argument 
for self-enforcement is untenable, because no “rational” citizen would 
believe that his or her actions could have any impact on the millions 
of other taxpayers.205 It is implausible that one person’s cheating will 
induce enough noncompliance to make cheating unattractive. Perhaps 
of greater importance for an adaptive contractarian, the effects of one 
person’s cheating is insufficient punishment to convince other 
taxpayers not to cheat. In short, for the logician, the tax contract 
cannot create incentives without also having coercive forces. On the 
other hand, Hardin suggests that what appears implausible for a 
rational analyst may still be plausible enough to provide the basic 
belief needed to sustain a cooperative equilibrium.206  
Evolutionary game theory has some relevant results that illustrate 
the problem. Bendor noted that in two person games, the rapid 
vengeance that made the “tit for tat” strategy a winner in Axelrod’s 
prisoners dilemma tournaments became an obstacle in tournaments 
 
 204. LINDBLOM, supra note 197. 
 205. HARDIN, supra note 173. 
 206. Id. (reporting the difficulty Hardin had in getting his well-instructed college students 
to understand the impossibility of contingent actions).  
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where players made occasional mistakes.207 By punishing players 
who accidentally defected, the tit-for-tat strategy imposed more 
punishment cycles than other, less vengeful strategies.208  
Similarly, a citizenry that responds too rapidly to a democratic 
government’s occasional inappropriate responses would spend more 
time in unproductive punishment cycles, particularly if the punitive 
response of a small set of disgruntled citizens triggered a cascading 
sequence of defections in the larger population. A citizenry with 
slower adaptation might avoid the unproductive punishment cycles, 
but may lose some control over the state. 
Hirschman’s analysis of consumer strategies to control product 
quality illustrates this trade off.209 Hirschman notes that consumers 
can change corporate behavior when a product’s quality falls below 
expectations either by not buying the product (exit) or by 
complaining to the corporation (voice).210 If all consumers exited 
immediately, the corporation would not have time to correct the 
quality problem before it collapsed.211 On the other hand, if no 
consumers exited, choosing instead to complain about the product, 
the corporation has little incentive to correct the problem.212 Thus, an 
efficient error correction mechanism requires a sufficient number of 
loyal customers who complain but continue to buy products, giving 
the corporation a sufficient cushion to correct the mistake.213  
In the tax arena, the consumer’s exit option corresponds to the 
rapid decline in contingent compliance resulting from failing policies, 
excessive taxes, and overly stringent enforcement. The consumer’s 
voice option corresponds to complaints filed with the IRS and the 
court system as well as the constituency services and oversight 
actions of elected officials. It takes considerable time and effort to 
change tax and enforcement policies. Finally, a relatively slow 
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adjustment process in an individual’s heuristics corresponds to 
“loyalty,” a willingness to give institutions a chance to correct the 
problems before exiting. Of course, the adaptive contractarian’s 
willingness is not a conscious decision, but is rather the result of the 
heuristic processes applied to exchanges with institutions. While 
these processes are undoubtedly quite different for public and private 
institutions, reflecting the greater concern with the public sector’s use 
of coercive controls, the basic problems of developing workable 
controls through voice and exit mechanisms and determining the 
appropriate loyalty level are quite similar for both citizen and 
consumer sovereignty theories. Given the assumptions of cognitive 
limitations in the adaptive contractarian perspective, similar cognitive 
structures and heuristic patterns are likely to govern exit and voice 
relating to public as well as private institutions. 
In sum, the IRS’s role in assuring taxpayers that others will pay is 
more important than the direct deterrence threat in sustaining existing 
levels of compliance. At the same time, maintaining assurance in 
dynamic contexts is the least understood aspect of compliance. It is 
clear that a sense of obligation is directly related to compliance. It is 
not clear, however, how quickly an individual’s sense of obligation 
responds to positive and negative experiences and information about 
the government. Nor does a strong theoretical foundation exist for 
predicting appropriate rates of adaptation for institutional conditions. 
VI. DESIGNING A TAX ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM FOR ADAPTIVE 
CONTRACTARIANS 
Our primary argument in the forthcoming book is that the adaptive 
contractarian perspective provides the best model for explaining tax 
compliance. In this section, I will consider the implications of this 
model for enforcement policy, because the policy implications of the 
adaptive contractarian perspective differ significantly from the 
implications of the deterrence or the duty models. We (the book’s 
authors) believe that the adaptive contractarian model provides a 
more practical and comprehensive perspective than duty or deterrence 
alone and serves as a more intelligent basis for the discussion of 
several important issues.  
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A. Balancing Assurance and Procedural Justice 
Enforcement policy is considerably more complex for the adaptive 
contractarian perspective than it is for either the deterrence or the 
duty perspective. Too little coercion can lead to a failure in assurance, 
while too much coercion can adversely affect perceptions of 
procedural justice. The impact coercion has on an a citizen’s 
commitment to meet tax obligations could dramatically reduce 
compliance, particularly if the amount of coercion exceeds a 
threshold beyond which cooperation collapses. Thus, optimal 
enforcement requires a balancing act. In particular, an agency’s 
coercive activities must be carefully targeted toward taxpayer 
activities that are the most threatening to the cooperative equilibrium 
and targeted away from inadvertent or sporadic noncompliance by 
otherwise honest taxpayers. 
Consider first the assurance problem, which becomes particularly 
acute when changes affecting a subpopulation induce noncompliance. 
Credible commitment to the social contract requires that the 
government’s coercive response be perceived as sufficient to counter 
a noticeable growth in noncompliance. If other taxpayers can get 
away with cheating, the adaptive contractarian is unlikely to maintain 
his or her commitment to obey.214  
Insufficient coercion against tax evaders may reduce assurance, 
but excessive coercion can also cause a decline in duty that threatens 
the stability of compliance. Excess coercion induces the procedural 
justice problem. Incentive compatibility requires sufficient deterrence 
 
 214. For example, consider wage earners who pay directly to the IRS through withholdings. 
When wage earners perceive that the IRS is doing nothing to stop widely reported cheating by 
self-employed businessmen, the wage earners are likely themselves to seek unreported sources 
for extra income or claim questionable deductions.  
 Levi describes the assurance problem that threatened to undermine the Australian tax 
system after a Supreme Court decision rendering impossible the enforcement of a business tax. 
LEVI, supra note 1. Amidst widely reported decreases in tax payments, the legislature and tax 
office were required to undertake bold actions to shore up the tax system. Id. The legislature 
closed the main loopholes the Supreme Court decision caused, while the tax office was 
reorganized and enforcement activities aimed at those taking advantage of the loopholes were 
dramatically expanded in order to assure Australian taxpayers that everyone would be required 
to pay their fair share of taxes. Id. The newly invigorated agency increased the deterrence threat 
to cheaters, but the critical purpose was to restore the assurances necessary to maintain the 
contingent compliance of the average taxpayer. Id. 
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against evaders, but it also requires safeguards against “coercive 
confiscation” by the government. As discussed above, maintaining 
citizens’ control over the government’s coercive powers is the central 
problem of democracy. The problem for the adaptive contractarian is 
to differentiate between an efficient enforcement agency required for 
assurance and an overly stringent agency that uses excessive force to 
extract more taxes than are legitimate. As Barzel notes, the difficulty 
in distinguishing legitimate complaints of harassment from protests 
by detected evaders exacerbates the problem.215  
The previous discussion argued that procedural justice was the 
most critical aspect of the institutional behavior that adaptive 
contractarians monitor, so it is not surprising to find procedural 
justice is a major issue for the IRS. When an agency uses extremely 
coercive tactics on the wrong population, it risks alienating adaptive 
contractarians concerned with limiting government excesses.216 Given 
the inherent difficulty in identifying tax cheats before the audit, the 
procedures used during the audit become very important in 
determining the impact on taxpayer attitudes. Professional treatment 
that respects a taxpayer’s rights allows a taxpayer to present evidence, 
and explains the reasons for audit decisions that lead to positive 
evaluations, even when audit outcomes were adverse to the taxpayer.  
While individual impacts may be limited to the affected taxpayers 
and their social network, widespread media reports of abusive 
treatment may be a greater threat to the cooperative equilibrium. The 
IRS has the power to seize an individual’s assets and even to collect 
the individual’s wages, which is necessary to collect from clever tax 
evaders. Agency supervisors live in constant fear that one of their 
more aggressive agents will abuse these powers. Newspapers seek 
headlines about IRS employees abusing their power. Political parties 
want to be champions for the taxpayer who is treated unfairly by the 
IRS. The Republican-sponsored hearings on taxpayer abuse in 1998, 
for example, led to extensive changes in the orientation of the IRS.217  
Although procedural justice reforms need not always lead to 
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diminished enforcement efficiency, public attention at a given 
moment has a tendency to focus more on one than the other, and 
collection agencies respond by gravitating toward one extreme or the 
other. For example, the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
led to a substantial shift in emphasis toward procedural justice.218 
Within a few years, the General Accounting Office reported that 
improvements in procedural justice resulted in falling collection and 
audit rates, and worried that deterrence was falling to excessively low 
levels.219  
The seemingly suboptimal investment in deterrence provides 
perhaps the strongest indicator that the American political system is 
more concerned with procedural justice than with assurance. The 
President and Congress consistently refuse requests to increase the 
IRS enforcement budget to the optimal deterrence point, even when 
every additional dollar was expected to increase collections by at 
least twelve dollars.220 Procedural justice problems inevitably 
accompany an increase in enforcement actions and adverse responses 
would presumably change the taxpayers’ sense of duty as much as it 
changes the voters’ electoral preferences. 
In sum, assurance and procedural justice reflect the contingent 
response of taxpayers. Insufficient coercion can lead to assurance 
problems for adaptive contractarians, while excessive coercion can 
lead to procedural justice problems. Maintaining a high compliance 
equilibrium among adaptive contractarians requires a delicate balance 
between these extremes. More importantly, it requires careful 
targeting of enforcement actions on suspected evaders to maximize 
deterrence while minimizing intrusive monitoring of compliant 
taxpayers. At present, our theoretical tools and empirical analyses can 
only warn us of the kinds of conditions that might induce failure. A 
more detailed understanding of the adaptive processes of both citizens 
and state tax institutions is critical not only for our understanding of 
democratic governance, but also for maintaining the current tax 
system and the democratic government it supports. 
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B. Interpreting the Contract: Enforcement, Ambiguity, and the 
Underground Economy 
For the adaptive contractarian, enforcement has less to do with 
deterrence and more to do with the interpretation of the implicit tax 
contract. The U.S. Tax Code allows taxpayers to minimize their taxes 
through all legal means and assumes that professional tax preparers 
represent the taxpayers’ rather than the state’s, interests when 
conflicts arise. This appears to be a reasonable method of 
encouraging the adaptive contractarian to remain satisfied with the 
system, and, hence, to comply with his or her obligations. 
However, aggressive tax avoidance can threaten the assurance that 
others are meeting their respective tax obligations. The dynamic 
nature of economic relations, combined with the opportunism of 
individuals wishing to make the best of a given contractual 
relationship, ensures that aggressive tax evaders and tax preparers 
will continuously seek loopholes to avoid tax obligations. This could 
undermine the intended impact of the tax code. In most instances, it is 
only through the enforcement process that the IRS discovers and 
corrects self-serving interpretations. Thus, as noted in the discussion 
of the hierarchical contract, it is in the taxpayers’ long-term interest to 
grant the state the ultimate authority to monitor and interpret the 
contract. Enforcement maintains the boundary between creative, 
opportunistic accounting and illegal, underground activities. 
Enforcement officials inevitably confront ambiguities as they 
apply statutes to the complex realities of dynamic economic 
relationships. The IRS’s prosecutorial decisions redefine the terms of 
the taxpayer contract by determining how statutory rules will be 
applied in new circumstances.221 To effectively reinterpret the 
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contract, legitimacy and efficiency are equally important 
considerations for meeting adaptive contractarians’ expectations in 
order to maintain high compliance levels. 
C. Maintaining Fairness: Complexity Versus Simplicity of the Tax 
Code 
An efficient tax code would presumably minimize the combined 
costs of compliance and enforcement by simplifying the code and 
taxing only the most apparent assets and capital. Yet, critics of the 
income tax system are quick to point out the complexity of the 
American income tax code and the burden it places on taxpayers and 
tax collectors. The blame for this inefficient, complex tax code is 
frequently directed at a political system designed to give away tax 
favors to special interest groups in return for electoral support.222 
The adaptive contractarian perspective does not necessarily 
challenge either this excessive complexity or dubious political 
motivation, but suggests that the process that generates complexity 
also sustains the legitimacy needed to maintain a high compliance 
equilibrium. As noted in the Barzel discussion in section II, the 
electoral system functions concurrently with contingent compliance 
to provide controls over the state’s coercive powers. To the extent 
that laws promulgated by an elected government adapt to changing 
circumstances in a manner consistent with the legitimacy of the tax 
code, compliance can be maintained by less coercive force, 
expanding the government’s ability to facilitate wealth-enhancing 
exchanges. The critical question, then, is whether electoral incentives 
that provide tax benefits are reasonably synchronized with 
perceptions of legitimacy, resulting in adaptive changes in the tax 
code that generally maintain legitimacy, and hence compliance by 
adaptive contractarians. 
The argument supporting this perspective notes that tax favors for 
special groups must be justified by policy purposes valid at the time 
of passage. They therefore allow adjustments in the basic tax contract 
that reflect mitigating circumstances and justify some form of tax 
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relief. The piecemeal changes in tax liability that result eventually 
lead to considerable inequality in tax obligations and limitations to 
revenue collection, triggering a reform cycle to reduce this unjustified 
special treatment.223 This reform cycle could give the tax code an 
adaptive capability that crudely matches changing perceptions of 
ongoing social and economic changes.  
The tax literature analyzes three types of equity comparisons that 
could affect taxpayers’ sense of obligation to pay taxes. Exchange 
equity compares the utility of government benefits with the utility the 
individual could have obtained if taxes paid to the government were 
spent on private consumption. The adaptive contractarian model 
suggests the possibility that a greater exchange equity induces a 
greater sense of obligation to pay. 
The other two types compare the equity of the tax contract to other 
taxpayers rather than to the government. Horizontal equity compares 
costs and benefits to other comparable groups in the population, while 
vertical equity focuses specifically on the relative cost and benefits 
for taxpayers of different income levels. All three comparisons are 
potentially relevant to an adaptive contractarian and may provide 
separate categories through which taxpayers monitor the contractual 
arrangement. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The adaptive contractarian perspective suggests that cognitive 
structures and heuristic patterns developed for a broad array of 
exchange relationships provide the most comprehensive basis for 
jointly analyzing both compliance and enforcement. Applying this 
evolution-based model to the collective action analysis provides a 
 
 223. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, for example, was generally portrayed as a victory for 
reformers over special interest groups because it revoked over 50 special tax privileges. See 
JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1988). By repealing special 
privileges and therefore broadening the base, tax rates could be lowered without losing 
revenues. Although lower tax rates were a critical component for political success, legislators 
feared that the existence of so many special exemptions undermined the legitimacy of the tax 
system. Id. In particular, a rapidly growing number of taxpayers aggressively utilized the code’s 
complexity to claim tax loopholes and evade their obligations. By repealing most special 
exemptions, aggressive tax avoidance was dramatically reduced. Id. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/5
p139 Scholz.doc  9/23/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]   Contractual Compliance and The Federal Income Tax 203 
 
theoretical perspective capable of integrating the deterrence and duty 
approaches most commonly used to understand and analyze tax 
compliance. When placed in a contractual perspective that 
emphasizes both the efficiency of state enforcement and the need to 
control the state’s coercive powers, the adaptive contractarian 
perspective provides a comprehensive view of the tax system. 
The broader theme of the forthcoming book is to clarify the 
relationship between cooperation and centralized coercion in 
resolving collective action problems. Coercion plays an essential role 
in expanding cooperative solutions to collective action beyond small 
homogeneous group settings. However, we have only a primitive 
understanding of how judicial institutions, electoral mechanisms, and 
contingent strategies combine to control concentrated enforcement 
powers while expanding the scope of the exchanges that they enforce. 
The joint evolution of adaptive citizenship strategies and the 
institutions to which they respond creates a delicate balance of 
cooperation. It is unknown how stable this underlying equilibrium is 
or how well legislative and oversight institutions respond to 
opportunities to expand cooperation. It is also unknown how well 
citizens’ evaluation and updating processes provide incentive 
compatible mechanisms aligning the interests of coercive institutions 
and a diversity of citizens. Finally, the issue of how effectively the 
cognitive and heuristic mechanism behind contingent compliance 
provides additional controls to fortify the relatively clumsy and slow-
moving electoral system is unclear. We hope our forthcoming book 
will place these issues squarely on the policy and political science 
research agenda. 
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